M&A Advisor Podcast

The episode contains genuine practitioner-level insight - particularly Scott's taxonomy of LME structures (drop-downs, Perry-plus, double-dip) and Mike's cost dynamics around pre-chapter 11 vs. in-chapter 11 fees - but is padded with repetitive affirmations, vague macro commentary on tariffs and interest rates, and meandering panel crosstalk that dilutes the substantive density.

“if you think chapter 11 is expensive, wait until you see your bills pre chapter 11 and then in chapter 11”

“we just did a Pre pack in 20 days, and the client was saying, can we do it in two days?”

The walkthrough of evolved LME structures - Perry-plus nomenclature, non-pro-rata up-tier exchanges, drop-down mechanics - is specialist content not commonly discussed at this level of precision; however, the broader framing (macro uncertainty, lender-on-lender violence, private credit pressure) recycles themes circulating widely in restructuring circles without adding a genuinely contrarian or first-principles argument.

“it's got a peri claim at the restricted group, plus it's got a priority claim on these new assets that were moved into the unsub, hence the Perry plus nomenclature”

“the technology continues to evolve. It also evolves a lot when, you know, some of the lenders and the credit agreements, they'll put all these kind of what we call blockers in the credit agreements”

The panel consists of genuine high-volume practitioners - a senior PJT restructuring banker (formerly Blackstone), a restructuring attorney claiming ~300 Chapter 11 filings since COVID, and a working independent director with named board experience - not career podcast guests or abstract thought leaders; the fourth voice (moderator/real estate advisor) is less senior but grounded in live deal activity.

“when I joined Blackstone back in 2011, so before the spin out right into PJT”

“since COVID we probably have filed close to 300 Chapter 11 cases”

The episode scores above average on specificity - $35M adverse-counsel bills in a three-month case, 700M debt vs. 80M EBITDA in a live deal, 6-7x leverage on 30-40% COVID-inflated EBITDA, a named Acoustis Technologies/SpaceX outcome, and J. Crew as a drop-down archetype - but is held back by deliberate vagueness on dollar figures ('X million to like triple'), absent deal names in most examples, and soft percentage estimates ('a very high percentage').

“I think our adverse counsel in a case that's three months old, I think their bills are about $35 million”

“private credit lenders gave them all six, seven times leverage on an EBITDA that might have jumped 30, 40% in 21, 22 into 23”

The moderator makes a genuine attempt to push for specifics - asking for percentage success rates on LMEs, requesting named case studies, and trying to extract sector predictions - but largely accepts non-answers ('it depends how you define success') without pressing further, and several questions are repetitively structured or overly open-ended; the panel format itself limits the depth of any single follow-up thread.

“When an LME gets started, if you had to take a guess on percentages, 50, 50, they're working 70, um, 5, 25. What's your experience?”

“Yeah, no 100%. I mean we're seeing um, we still see a lot of things, you know, out of court. We still see a lot of chapter 11s as well”