
Trust.ID Talk · 2026-07-02 · 11 min
Key moments - from our scoring
Substance score
57 / 100
Five dimensions, 20 points each
Stefan Wenig argues that organizations treating code signing as an isolated certificate management problem are missing the bigger picture of secure software development. Code signing is woven into DevOps workflows, supply chain security, and organizational processes - requiring alignment across development, security, and operations teams. Recent regulatory shifts, particularly CAB Forum baseline requirements mandating FIPS-certified hardware for key storage and limiting certificate validity to one year, are forcing change. However, these rules primarily apply to public CAs in the Microsoft, Apple, Google, and Java ecosystems; Linux, firmware, and other platforms remain largely unregulated despite high-profile incidents. Wenig stresses that most organizations are "flying blind" - unable to inventory their certificates or understand how they're being used. He recommends starting with centralized certificate procurement and discovery, then progressing toward flexible configuration systems that allow central policy changes without touching individual development teams. The conversation also addresses the looming challenge of post-quantum cryptography and crypto agility, where organizations must prepare now to switch to quantum-safe algorithms like MLDSA, even though platform vendors are still implementing support. The episode is essential for security leaders, DevOps engineers, and compliance teams navigating evolving code signing requirements.
The CAB Forum introduced two major changes: first, a FIPS requirement mandating that code signing keys be stored on certified hardware devices (preventing key copying and theft), and second, a reduction in maximum certificate validity from three years to one year, effective March of this year.
Most organizations don't have centralized certificate discovery and procurement for code signing (unlike web services), and key management systems typically only return hash codes rather than usage data, leaving security teams unaware of what certificates exist and how they're being used.
Crypto agility is the ability to switch between cryptographic algorithms without major system overhauls; it's critical because organizations must prepare now to migrate to quantum-safe algorithms like MLDSA, even though platform vendors like Microsoft are still implementing support and likely won't be ready for another 12+ months.
The baseline requirements primarily apply to public certificate authorities serving Microsoft, Apple, Google, and Java ecosystems; Linux, firmware, motherboards, and other platforms remain unregulated despite security incidents.
Establish centralized certificate procurement and discovery infrastructure so you know what certificates exist, who has access, and what's being used for - then choose a flexible platform that allows central policy changes without requiring individual development teams to update their build scripts and workflows.
Our reviewer’s read on each dimension, with quotes from the episode.
The episode covers meaningful ground on code signing infrastructure, baseline requirements, and post-quantum cryptography preparedness, but suffers from significant filler and repetition. The core insights - centralized key management, lack of visibility, and crypto agility - are valuable but compressed into an 11-minute format with padding (the opening hook, the closing tech gadget question) that dilutes density.
Code signing is a process much more than any isolated key management or certificate management issue
If you don't know where your keys are, if you don't know what certificates have been issued in your organization's name, well, then you're basically figured out for you
The guest reframes code signing as a systemic organizational process rather than isolated technical control, which is somewhat fresh. However, the broader themes - centralization, visibility, compliance frameworks, post-quantum preparation - are increasingly standard in security discourse. The framing lacks truly contrarian or first-principles thinking.
Code signing is a process much more than any isolated key management or certificate management issue
Crypto agility is the key here
Stefan Wenig as CEO/CTO of SignPath brings direct operational experience in code signing infrastructure and shows deep familiarity with PKI standards, CAB forum requirements, and post-quantum roadmaps. However, as the founder of a vendor in this space, there is an inherent incentive to emphasize centralization and platform adoption. His seniority is clear but the guest has a commercial interest in the solutions discussed.
Stefan Wenig, CEO and CTO at SignPath
I think a lot of code signing happens in the Windows ecosystem where most organizations were already using standard validation certificates
The episode references concrete industry developments (CAB forum changes, FIPS requirements, one-year certificate validity reduction, NIST algorithms, MLDSA) but provides minimal quantified impact, no customer examples, no specific incident analysis, and no data on the scale of the problem despite the title invoking 'billion dollar' losses. Specificity remains largely at the regulatory and technical level without operational metrics.
Code signing certificates by CAs cannot be issued for up to three years any longer. But just a single year
GSM vendors are implementing the NIST certified uh, algorithms. The first vendors are already there
The host asks reasonable setup questions and nods to frameworks mentioned (the puzzle analogy, crypto agility), but rarely pushes back, challenge claims, or drill into contradictions. The questions are open-ended without sharp follow-ups on the billion-dollar claim, the gap between knowledge and action, or how organizations actually fail. The closing tech gadget question wastes the remaining time and shows lack of interview discipline.
I love the analogy of the picture and the puzzle and how code signing is part of uh, that puzzle
What is the one piece of tech you could not live without?
Computed from the transcript - who did the talking, and the words that came up most.
In this episode of Trust.ID Talk: The Digital Certificate and Identity Security Podcast, host Michelle Davidson is joined by Stefan Wenig, CEO and CTO at SignPath, to discuss why code signing must be treated as a complete business process, not simply a matter of managing keys and certificates. They explore how changing baseline requirements are reshaping code signing, why organizations need greater visibility into their certificate landscapes, and how centralized infrastructure can bring development, operations, and security teams into alignment. What You’ll Learn: Why code signing is a wider security and operational process How evolving baseline requirements are changing code signing practices Why visibility into keys and certificates must come before greater control How centralized procurement and infrastructure reduce security gaps Why crypto agility is essential for post-quantum readiness Stefan Wenig is the CEO and CTO of SignPath. He specializes in code signing, secure software development, certificate management and the infrastructure organizations need to protect their software supply chains.
Transcribed and scored by The B2B Podcast Index.
Speaker A: Code signing is a process. Much more than any isolated key management or certificate management issue
Speaker B: with software trust isn't a certainty. Behind the dozens of applications and programs that we use every day are, uh, layers of trust that most of us never see. As supply chain attacks increase and code signing requirements evolve, organizations are rethinking how they build sign and ship software. You're listening to Trusted Talk and I'm your host, Michelle Davidson. And today I'm joined by Stefan Wenig, CEO and CTO at SignPath, to break how new baseline requirements are, uh, changing the game and how to keep your supply chain rolling as the landscape evolves. Hi Stefan.
Speaker A: Hi Vishal. Thanks for having me.
Speaker B: Awareness for the need for CO signing has been growing in recent years. There's been recognition around strengthening CO signing practices with the CAB forum and, and introducing new baseline requirements this year with reducing the maximum validities. So with the growing awareness around CO signing, what are some of the other areas that you feel organizations might still be missing?
Speaker A: I think what we're really missing here is that code signing is a process much more than any isolated key management or certificate management issue. And also code signing is uh, part of a larger process of secure software development, of DevOps and of operations. We also need to be aware that there's a lot of players involved here that don't necessarily understand the whole picture here. So it's important to lay it out for everybody who's involved and make sure that all the little practices really work together, uh, to achieve the ultimate goal of security. So I think it's not a big surprise that we see a lot of incidents, high, uh, level incidents, severe incidents happening in the industry that basically have nothing to do with key management or certificate management practices. We just need to get a better awareness of the big picture here.
Speaker B: I love the analogy of the picture and the puzzle and how code signing is part of uh, that puzzle. I know sometimes it's often referred to the infinity loop, but the puzzle piece is just one part of a much bigger picture. I really like that analogy. So I mentioned the baseline requirements. Could you give an overview of what they are, previous changes, where is it now and um, what could organizations in the next few years to help put those pieces of the puzzle together?
Speaker A: The last two years two things were happening. So first we saw a change in the FIPS requirements. So initially we had a separation where we had uh, normal code signing certificates or OV or organization validated certificates that basically had no requirements at all. And we had extended validation certificates that required a, uh, FIPS Certified device, uh, for the keys, meaning that there is no way that the key band can be copied from the device and from that follows that the cannot be stolen. Right. So I think a lot of code signing happens in the Windows ecosystem where most organizations were already using standard validation certificates. But that basically made it the law of the land to have uh, code signing keys on um, dedicated devices. But of course that only applies to anything that's ruled by the CEP form and that's mainly public certificate authorities. So uh, there is uh, basically still no regulation about what happens with code signing keys outside the typical ecosystems of Microsoft, Microsoft, Apple, Google, Java. So if you're looking at Linux, if you're looking at firmware, if you're looking at motherboards, uh, even there has been a major incident, there is still no regulation. But yeah, that's a big step, right? So at least there is an industry recognition. Code signing keys have to be secure, you cannot just have them in files. It's just reckless. And a year later we had a change. That said, uh, code signing certificates by CAs cannot be issued for up to three years any longer. But just a single year. What will we see in the future? I'm hearing that Microsoft is going to unify extended validation and organization validation certificates and of course the other things. Big thing, the elephant in the room here is post quantum cryptography. Wildly varying expectations of when those things will be around or will be required. When quantum computers will be able to actually break codes. Right. We don't know it but we have to prepare now with signing we don't have the problem of copy first and decrypt later. Right. If you have a properly signed file, maybe the signature won't be safe in a year. But nobody can decrypt any sensitive information. But you should be prepared to re sign things on a moment's notice if something unexpected happens. Right. The other thing of course is crypto agility. Every organization should prepare in every aspect of their crypto procedures to be able to uh, switch to quantum safe algorithms. And currently we see that this is happening. GSM vendors are implementing the NIST certified uh, algorithms. The first vendors are already there. Everybody will follow shortly. What will probably be a bit later is all the platform vendors supporting MLDSA in their signature formats like Microsoft. And everybody's still working on that. And it's nice if we can create MLDSA uh, signatures, but it doesn't help us anything if Windows uh, and other systems won't recognize them. So this is probably another year out guess but it's Just a wild guess. So, yeah, crypto agility is the key here.
Speaker B: It's really interesting you mentioned that crypto agility has come, um, up on the podcast a number of times from different guests. And you mentioned earlier around automation, crypto agility, post quantum, they all sort of play together in that bigger picture. So focusing on the smaller picture of the systems and how they work, the DevOps that you mentioned earlier. But if you take that step back in the bigger picture, that is looking at how the workflows of the organizations fit within what they're trying to do, right?
Speaker A: You need to know what's going on. That's the first step. If you don't know where your keys are, if you don't know what certificates have been issued in your organization's name, well, then you're basically figured out for you. If you have all these things centralized, it probably still doesn't mean that you know what everybody's doing with it. If you're just assigning access permissions to keys and certificates, it doesn't really give you a good idea of what's being done with it. Um, due to the nature of typical signing architectures, you don't usually get the information on the side of the key management systems. You get hash codes, right? You cannot really gather, uh, any data from here. And so you might have some configuration data that goes with that that allows you to get some, I don't know, statistics or usage data. But I think a lot of organizations are still flying blind here and basically don't know what certificates are there even if they know what they're exactly being used for. And that's the first step. And we can go from there, right? Once we know it, the next question becomes how flexible is the, uh, configuration system that you have here? Do you have to go into every single development team and have them review their build scripts and exchange key format, uh, command line options in every kind of place? Or is it more like a central switch where you can just say, uh, this project should use that certificate now? There's a big difference too.
Speaker B: So how can organizations kind of prepare for those future industry shifts that you talked about? Those expectations have changed, given some your estimations on the timelines, but particularly to ensure that dev development and security teams are aligned on what they're trying to do. What can organizations do now besides getting an overview of, uh, their current certificate landscape?
Speaker A: So what you often do in that situation is you have some kind of certificate discovery mechanisms, but it usually works for things like web service. It doesn't work as well for code signing. Because where would you start discovering that if you don't have it managed already? My first step would always be make sure that you have centralized infrastructure. Make sure that you have centralized certificate procurement and key assurance. Make sure that everybody in your organization knows what the certificates are. Make sure that you know that nobody has like a credit card contract with some certificate authority that you're not even aware of. So that's the first thing. Make sure that the procurement, uh, channels are clear. And for internal certificates, for internally managed keys, make sure that everybody who uses these keys knows where to get them from. So you don't have like bilateral relationships between development and operations where they agree on some key exchange mechanism. This also has to be part of the central management. And then m. Yeah, as a security person I would just say go ahead and monopolize, uh, this thing. You have to control that, right? Whenever somebody needs a Q certificate, it has to go through some kind of central infrastructure and some kind of centralized process. And once you have that, at least you know who has access to what certificate. Right. And everything down from there. Like if you want to have more information, if you want to have more control. My suggestion would be to choose the platform wisely that you use. Make sure that you understand the possibilities and the limitations of the platform because otherwise you will probably just try to make up for weaknesses with processes. That's typically not a good place to be.
Speaker B: You mentioned around making sure you have a vendor, uh, suitable for your business needs with the maximum validities that obviously that is going to impact workflow. So that relationship you hold with your vendor is going to be super critical because right now it's been put in place as of March this year. But that could change at any point. As we've seen across the PKI landscape industry, it's happened to many different certificate types. So having that vendor uh, in place that you trust and can work with on those changes is really crucial.
Speaker A: And um, also have like a central place where you can change these things without reaching out to every single development team in your organization and giving them a how to and a deadline.
Speaker B: Yeah, that's really interesting. That concludes kind of a really interesting conversation for us around the importance of code signing and how it is putting it into practice. And um, so we do like to ask our guest Stefan, one final question. What is the one piece of tech you could not live without?
Speaker A: Well, of course I'm addicted to my phone. Like everybody is so guilty. I'm not a tech gadget person. Really try to keep that thing out of my personal life. So it's probably the phone. Who can live without a smartphone these days, right?
Speaker B: One piece of technology can sometimes rule our lives. That is all we have time for today. So if you have been listening and you have a question about this topic or there's another topic you would like us to discuss on the podcast, please leave us a comment or get in touch@, uh, trust.idtalkobalsirring.com thank you for joining us today, Stefan.
Speaker A: Thank you, Michelle. Thanks for having me.
Speaker B: You're welcome. It's been an absolute pleasure. And to everyone listening, this has been Trusted Talk. Until next time.
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