Threat Talks

The episode delivers solid, fact-based information about submarine cable infrastructure, disruption causes, and repair challenges that most B2B operators wouldn't encounter in standard reading. Key insights include the distinction between cable cuts vs. shunt damage, the 150-200 annual faults baseline despite 1.7M km of cable, and repair permitting barriers - however, substantial portions consist of definitional explanation and geopolitical framing that, while relevant, doesn't pack novel operational density throughout.

“99% of the data flows over the subsea cables”

“throughout the years, it's only about 150 to 200 cable faults a year. At the same time, the number of kilometers on cables increasing tremendously”

The episode distinguishes itself by reframing sabotage concerns with data (most faults are anchors, fishing, natural causes, not state actors) and highlighting repair capacity/permitting as the real vulnerability - contrarian to typical media narratives. However, the core frameworks (redundancy, geopolitical risk, satellite vs. fiber tradeoffs) and the emphasis on sovereignty are well-trodden themes in infrastructure discussion. The perspective is grounded and corrective rather than deeply original.

“there's still hardly any evidence of any sabotage on the submarine cables”

“What stood out especially, is the difference between what you read in the media and hear from politicians. And on the other side, if you look at the facts”

Ernst Noorman is a practitioner-diplomat with direct operational involvement - he sits on the newly formed ITU Advisory Board on Submarine Cable Resilience (42 members, established Nov 2024), advises governments on cybersecurity law implementation (Netherlands Cybersecurity Council), and has on-the-ground experience in multiple countries and conflict zones. He represents substantive policy-making, not punditry. However, he is primarily a policy/diplomatic voice rather than a cable operator or engineer executing at scale, which limits top-tier caliber.

“Ernst is also a diplomat who used to serve in Burkina Faso, Afghanistan, Colombia and Surinam. He now represents the Netherlands in an ITU Advisory board on subsea cable infrastructure”

“It's the advisory body on submarine cable resilience created in November 2024. It's a 42 membership, 42 members indeed like you said, governments, regulators and industry together”

The episode anchors claims in concrete data: 150-200 annual faults, 1M km cables (2014) vs. 1.7M km (2024), Tonga's 61-day disconnection (2022), 18mm cable diameter, 80km repeater spacing, examples of 2+ year repair delays, and specific regional cases (Congo River landslides, North Sea congestion). However, many geopolitical assertions (Russia shadow fleet, spying) lack specifics - no named ships, dates, or incidents. Overall mix of strong data on infrastructure with vaguer claims on threat actors.

“throughout the years, it's only about 150 to 200 cable faults a year. At the same time, the number of kilometers on cables increasing tremendously just give you one figure in 2014 there were a million kilometers of cable. Oh. Ten years later, it was 1.7 million kilometers”

“Tonga was in 2022, for 61 days disconnected from the internet because they had only one cable connection”

The host (Peter) asks competent, structured follow-up questions (explaining advisory body mandate, drilling into threats vs. repair vs. redundancy, probing espionage risk, asking about real-world business impact for CEOs) and demonstrates product knowledge (references AMS-IX involvement, NIS2, geopolitical context). However, questioning is largely confirmatory rather than challenging; the host rarely pushes back on claims, probes contradictions, or demands tighter evidence. The flow is conversational but somewhat deferential - Ernst controls the frame throughout without meaningful adversarial engagement.

“Can you explain what this advisory body is and what you do?”

“But then again, if most of my data is flowing over these sea cables and my business is depending on that data, can you talk about that a bit more? Why should I or companies be worried about these sea cables?”