210. Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges: “Russia Is Already at War With Us” - Making Decisions Under Uncertainty, Taking Ownership Without Blame & Ethical Dilemmas in AI Decision-Making

Speaker A: So 21 drones, uh, landed in Poland. None of them carried a warhead. This is not an accident. There's 21 of them. None of them are armed. These are 21 that were sent to test our preparations, our defenses, our readiness. And I think the Russians will have taken from this that we are not ready. A key is our political leaders being candid about Russia is at war with us. Even if we don't think we're at war with them, they are absolutely at war with us.

Speaker B: Have you ever been in a situation where you've felt like you had to take responsibility, but it was really, really another person's mistake?

Speaker A: Um, well, of course I did. The plan changed on us at the last minute during the initial invasion of Iraq. And you really just wanted to go. You wanted to punch somebody. But okay, I mean, there are selfish people out there that will say, you know, f you, I'm not doing that. And you still are expected to be successful somehow.

Speaker C: Should we be considering that seriously?

Speaker A: Y. Absolutely consider it seriously. Because the Russians, uh, consider it seriously. You need to be thinking maybe even for two weeks, you know, before help. Ground help arrives. Now. The air force will be there immediately.

Speaker C: Hello friends. We're back with another episode of Pursuit of Scrappiness podcast. Whether you're building business, running a team, or just starting out in your career, we are again here to bring you scrappy and actionable insights to help you become more productive. My name is Janis Zeps. I'm co hosting this with my friend Uldistarout. Count as always. Hey.

Speaker B: Hello sir.

Speaker C: And before we start, quick reminder, follow us on Spotify and Apple podcast. It helps more than you know. Uh, in exchange for that, you will find 210 episodes there already. We cover all sorts of topics that you need to become scrappier and better version of yourself in life and business. Plenty to explore if this is the first time you're listening to us. And uh, you will be the first one to know when the episodes drop on Tuesdays, if you follow us. So that's why we're really asking for this. Please, please do. Alright, uh, another plug, Shameless plug. But we're doing this episode in cooperation with Nordic Business Forum. Ah, 2025. I've been there in the past myself. Tremendous event. It's in Helsinki, September 24th and 25th this year. So be very quick and grab a ticket if you can. Really, uh, tremendous event. Great speakers this year. Guys like Rick Rubin, Simon Sinek, Mildimitkuta are coming. And also our today's guest will be There and will be speaking there. Uh, his name is probably familiar to many of you already. And we're very happy to welcome today Lieutenant General Ben Hodges. He's the former commanding general of all U.S. army forces in Europe. And, um, we've probably, a lot of us have listened to his commentary over the past three years. Very sought after analyst in these times. Welcome, General.

Speaker A: Hey, guys. Thank you very much for the privilege.

Speaker C: And, uh, to the listeners, we will dive right in. What you can expect to learn today, as you know and as you have noticed, especially if you live in our neck, uh, of the woods in the Baltics and northern Europe, these are very uncertain times. So not only geopolitically, but also in business. So we thought of using this opportunity to talk about decision making, to talk about how you can keep running your business and your life making decisions without knowing all the facts, with all the uncertainties. Age of AI Very, um, interesting topic to explore with our today's guest. And of course, we cannot miss the opportunity also to ask a bit about, um, current situation, recent developments in Poland, and how does the next steps actually look for Europe? But, yeah, let's dive right in. And I thought maybe as a first topic to start with, uncertainty and risks. It's something that my impression is that people in military probably are used to. People in civilian life probably want to avoid it. Um, but it's there. Um, and, um, one has to deal with it in business. When you build a business, there's always changing circumstances. And, uh, you always have, uh, uncertainty, doubt, risk. Um, what lessons maybe you have found that business leaders could learn from people who have been in your role in the military.

Speaker A: Well, of course, uh, uncertainty is a fact of life. Um, and so the most effective officers and sergeants I ever had were the ones that were able to operate, uh, successfully despite not having perfect information. Nobody is comfortable with it. We all would like to have perfect information, but it's just not going to ever be the case. Because especially if you have an opponent, whether it's a business or opponent or an, uh, adversary or more, they're going to be doing everything they can to unsettle you, keep you from knowing exactly what they're doing and what their capabilities are. So all of our training, uh, as well as our, um, selection and promotion systems are based on who are those people that can still do what has to be done in conditions of uncertainty. Which means they have to have the courage to take risk, to make a decision without perfect information. But we know from history that that's the nature of War. And you can't succeed unless you're able to operate in those conditions of uncertainty.

Speaker C: So almost people who can't, they never even kind of get to the top. Decision making, right?

Speaker A: Uh, right. Well, I mean if you uh, if the leader in a business crushes, um, people from making mistakes, um, then you can be sure people will learn from that not to ever make a mistake. And the only way to never make a mistake is to never do anything. And so this is why it's the responsibility of the leader to not uh, only talk about a desire for his or her subordinates to make decisions to use their initiative, but when it inevitably goes wrong at some point, if it was an honest mistake, you don't crush them. You train, re educate and give them other opportunities. Obviously a mistake that's made out of willful negligence or dishonesty, those get crushed. But if it's a mistake because somebody was trying to do something right to help the company, those are the kind of people you want to have. Mhm.

Speaker C: In that case, you mentioned mistakes. Do you give second chances, third chances to people? Or if the mistake was negligence, then you better not.

Speaker A: Well, uh, I can tell you from my own personal experience, I was in the army for 38 years. Uh, we could talk for hours about all the different mistakes that I made. So I grew up in a culture as uh, an infantry officer in different units, uh, where my commanders uh, always expected that I would take risk, that I would accept responsibility, uh, and that I would use my initiative and they would be more angry with me if I didn't. If I, if I avoided making a mistake by not using my initiative, they would be more unhappy with me. And so, um, whether it was getting lost or temporarily losing equipment or uh, being late getting somewhere, you know, whatever it was, or making a bad choice about something we were trying to do, um, whether that was in training or in Iraq or Afghanistan, um, the culture was always, um, we got to fix this. And so one of the, you know, part of this, um, culture is using something that we call the aar, the After Action Review. And it, and it's just a simple process of critical self analysis. After every event, every accident, every mistake or every operation, what happened? Why did it happen? How do you fix it? And so it's a, it's a very, uh, useful, healthy process. Now you can tailor it to, to fit the, the company or the organization or the culture you're trying to build. But the point is you have to address what happened. Why did we fail to do this? Why did that happen and then what do we have to do to fix it? And it's, uh, when the leader has to set the tone by, hey, you know, I may not have given very good guidance or, um, I was late in making a decision, or I overestimated our abilities. Um, so the leader sets the example. Then other people feel more confident that they can say, uh, oh, well, you know, maybe I should have done the following. That to me has always been one of the marks of a good organization, is that it's a learning organization.

Speaker B: Well, I guess a prerequisite for that is also like honesty, um, and honesty to self. And you know, to avoid putting blame is for that process to then be transparent. Because otherwise, if people will be kind of holding out information about what they did or what they thought that maybe led to the mistake, then you get a broken process. Uh, and, uh, as you mentioned, uh, that if you don't, uh, have people making mistakes, it means that they're not doing anything or it means that they're not talking about what they're doing. So.

Speaker A: Excellent point, Ola. See, uh, um, and sometimes if you're the leader, you have to pull a little bit. I mean, you've got more experience, typically than many of their teammates, and so you can sort of know what might have happened. And so feeling confident to say, okay, well, what about this? And asking the leading questions so that people would say, well, yeah, you know, I didn't think about that or underestimated how long it would take to get from A to B. Um, that's a part of it. But you, you put your finger on it. It is about integrity and, uh, and this trust that if you stand up in front of the rest of your team, you say, I screwed up, and here's why I think I screwed up, and here's what I got to do to fix it. You know, you're trusting that, uh, everybody sees you as contributing to the overall growth of the organization. Now, it's easy for me to talk about it. It's a little bit harder when it's. In practice, it's a little bit harder to do that. Um, but I, uh, would never support or promote somebody that their first reaction is to blame somebody else. I've always thought that one of the main principles of leadership was accepting responsibility. Um, and that's such a. I mean, that's how things get done. Somebody has to accept responsibility. Whether it's accepting responsibility for a mistake or you've got a tough task and you say, okay, I will do this. And, um, those are the people that I was always looking for, seeking to promote them, that were willing to take on a very difficult task, even if it meant there was a high risk that they might fail. Um, and very seldom do you get an organization where 100% of the people are like that. That's, that's, that's not, that's not human nature. But you do want an organization where you can identify that 10 to 15, maybe 20% that are your top tier. The ones that no matter what, you can count on them. And then you at least want the rest of the organization contributing in a positive way, helping, uh, assisting, um, in. In a variety of ways, depending on the organization. And so your training program has to be about getting as many people, at least into that second tier of helpers and assistors, um, to make sure that the top 20% can be super, uh, effective.

Speaker B: You mentioned about this, uh, you know, taking responsibility. Have you ever been in a situation where you've felt like you had to take responsibility, but it was really, really another person's mistake? Like, really, it's like not, not your fault at all. And then you're like, okay, I have this colleague or subordinate that really screwed up. I gave him all the information, I gave him the training. He screwed up. And now as a leader, have to kind of take responsibility. So have you had such situations?

Speaker A: Ah, well, of course I did. Um, whether it was, uh, maybe, uh, the plan changed on us at the last minute during the initial invasion of Iraq. Um, I mean, we would spend days planning for how we were going to go in, and then something would happen and the whole plan would be changed at the last minute. And you really just wanted to go. You wanted to punch somebody, but, okay, well, the mission changed. That's the nature of war, and that's uncertainty. And so we had to adjust. Um, and so that might mean that you didn't have as many, uh, um, trucks or helicopters that you thought you were going to have. And so you have to adjust. And it, it would have done no good to, to blame the aviation unit or the transportation unit. It's like, okay, this is what we got. And, and, and so a lot of what we did was always trying to, um, build this culture. Um, in fact, our mantra was we wanted to thrive in conditions of uncertainty. And so part of that is, um, how the leader reacts when a situation is messed up. You know, you don't want your soldiers or your subordinates seeing you yelling at the higher headquarters or an adjacent headquarters. You want people to say, okay, we can do this, and um, we'll figure out how to do it. Uh, again, easier said than done. Um, but I can, I can certainly remember times where, let's, um, just say, um, there was either a breakdown in communications or somebody else. Um, I mean, there are selfish people out there that will say, you know, f you, we're. I'm not doing that. And, uh, and you, you still are expected to be successful somehow. And again, this goes back to the culture of the organization, no matter what. And I would talk to my guys all the time and say, look, I guarantee you, you're never going to have enough, uh, everything that, what you need. You're never going to have 100% Manning. You're never going to have 100% of the logistics. You're never going to have enough time. But yet we still have to be successful. And so that was the culture, um, that I, that I always wanted to build. And I was typically in units where that was the culture as well. And I love that. I mean, I love being where, um, I had to use all of my creativity. And usually it was somebody else's creativity. I'd have some smart, younger officer or some, uh, old sergeant that said, well, sir, you know, why don't we try this? And that was the magic and that was the fun part.

Speaker C: Now it's so many similar things also. When building a business or working a business environment, another, uh, thing you see a lot in the companies is decision making. And the leader who has to make a decision is delaying it because he or she just wants more info. And I've done it myself. I've seen it done when I had wait for a decision. What's your advice in those situations when it's very important and you really don't want to mess it up, but, you know, you don't really have perfect information, you don't have perfect analysis and, you know, uh, understanding of the situation. But you need to move.

Speaker A: So, um, making a decision before it's too late, um, you know, when you can still, uh, achieve what needs to be achieved. Um, knowing when I had to make that decision was important. When somebody would say, so we gotta make a decision on we're gonna go left or right or what unit or whatever it is. And I would say what's. Yeah, of course, I wanted to retain some flexibility to get more information or wait for a situation to develop. So I tried to make, uh, sure we all knew when we had to have that decision, after which it was, it was gonna be too late. Um, and you build in a little buffer, uh, And I also would give that to my hires, whether if I was a staff officer or a commander, to make sure they knew, okay, sir, you can hang on to the decision for as long as you want, but the longer you take, the less flexibility we have. So identifying the decision point, the time, um, and then of course, you're looking for conditions. What are the conditions that will help you make that, make that decision? What are the pieces of information? You know, if you're talking about an airborne operation where you're going to jump into something or you're going to fly helicopters into an area, one of the preconditions is, have we, uh, destroyed the enemy's air defense? Because you're very vulnerable at that last minute. And so trying to have a high degree of certainty, never perfect, but a high degree of confidence that the enemy's air defense was gone. Uh, and then you say, okay, we're going, and then you do it. And, uh, almost always there would be something that we didn't get, but that was a risk that you were willing to take. Uh, and then you try to mitigate those things. But making the decision on time, um, and acknowledging this is why a lot of our professional study always looks at historical examples as well as Clausewitz, you know, in, uh, his book on war that talks about the nature of war. This is the way it is. It's uncertain, it's violent, uh, there's going to be friction. Somebody is going to make a mistake at some point, or, uh, a vehicle is going to break down at a critical time. So you have to have a organization that's able to deal with that. And it usually is going to be somebody at the point that has the confidence to retask themselves to do something different because of what they can see in front of them and then still accomplishes the mission. And I always wanted them to feel confident. I expected them to make that decision.

Speaker C: Uh, yeah. It's also why the organizations, if you have a, uh, CEO making all decisions and everybody is afraid and everybody needs to align every smallest thing, you don't have initiative. They operate very differently from organizations where you kind of give initiative, I guess, both in military and in business life as well.

Speaker A: Yeah. And of course it's reasonable and proper that some decisions have to be only for the CEO or the chairman or the director, you know, depending on what kind of organization or business you have. Um, and the same would be true in the military. There would be one or two decisions that were, um, you know, wake me up to do that if necessary. And it Might be, uh, a loss of a certain percentage of aircraft, or maybe it was, uh, um, whether or not to commit a reserve force, which is. But other than that, I generally was quite happy for, um, my deputies or the chief of operations to make decisions.

Speaker C: Now, of course, AI is causing a lot of uncertainty in people's minds, um, in all fields of life. Um, how do you yourself have seen the last three, four years when we have seen a really meteoric rise of AI, obviously in the military as well, but also in business. And, uh, maybe you have thought of what do people need to. What skills they need to cultivate to even become m. Stay relevant, uh, what things will get replaced, what wouldn't. Any thoughts on that topic?

Speaker A: Well, of course, artificial intelligence is such a broad term. I mean, there's a million different applications in different ways. Um, you know, from a military standpoint, of course, um, helping to, uh, make decisions faster, especially about targeting. You know, being able to strike a target faster than your normal processes might allow you to before the enemy could escape or to prevent, uh, something from happening. Uh, but also the, the. Probably for me, one of the coolest things I have ever heard anybody talk about, uh, the way that, uh, I don't want to be too specific, but let's just say one of our major headquarters um, is. Goes through a war gaming process where you're looking at all possible different scenarios and um, you want to play out. Okay, well, in this scenario, if I use this combination of capabilities, how would it go and how might the enemy react? And, and you do some of those. So what, what this organization had done, they had figured out how to record over time, every intelligence briefing, uh, every other exercise, all the things that were all fed into the, the process that helped them build up, I guess you would call this machine learning. But this was to build up, um, reactions and possible courses of action to deal with each scenario. So it accumulated so much information about the, uh, adversary, uh, took into account weather, um, and of course it was designed to constantly update so that, uh, if the commander said, okay, in this scenario, if we lost one of our critical capabilities, what, how would we still do it? And then the artificial intelligence would provide you with some recommendations. Now, of course you still have to make the decision, but the point is that to me sounded like what a terrific, uh, capability to help you think through because there's so many factors out there. And you can never eliminate the human factors. You know, the things where the real uncertainty happens. But at least in terms of, you know, doing the math on time, speed, distance Weapons capabilities, um, percentage of kill likelihood. Having that kind of help was something. But then there was another um, example that also I had not anticipated. But I participate, but I participated in a workshop about ah, artificial intelligence being used on new aircraft. I mean top, top of the line aircraft that were being developed. And um, this aircraft would be able to launch weapons faster than any pilot. Even the best pilot in the world, um, Maverick, you know, um, could not make decisions that fast. Right. Um, but then the concern was what about the ethical considerations? I mean, do you just let the device take over and start launching rockets or missiles? Um, how do you build in ethical considerations while still retaining that advantage of speed? Uh, I think that's a legitimate thing to consider.

Speaker C: Uh, it's a big one. Right. Also in business, like let's say AI becomes really good at decision making and the decision is, you know, we're going to lay off 15% of company tomorrow, uh, and AI takes it in half a second. Or in military, it's like we're going to sacrifice uh, a thousand people to uh, achieve this objective. And the decision is made, uh, in a split second. Would that be acceptable to many people? I think it's something we still are probably haven't figured out.

Speaker A: Well, this goes to that responsibility thing. I mean, you know, no commander could say, oh, we failed and we lost a thousand troops. But you know, I was just doing what the, what the device said, you know, you know, that's, that's, that's not going to be how it works.

Speaker B: Um, but what you mentioned is actually about this um, uh, directory of knowledge is actually something that would be also incredibly helpful for organizations to build kind of continuity of the way of doing business. Right. You have like, different kind of documents, procedures, trainings, you know, how we do things. And like, and depending on the size of the organization, obviously the bigger the organization, the more developed this is and more organized. But if you could figure out a way how to record all kinds of interactions that you had in all kinds of scenarios and build out this super employee who has seen everything that you have done, all of the decisions you have made, the mistakes, the offers you have sent to clients, uh, the issues that they have complained about. And then uh, you have this kind of assistant, uh, that can help you, like, hey, we did it like this, it worked. And then it's uh, less dependent on uh, couple brains at the top of the organization or some kind of uh, written training and materials and things like that. So I think that this kind of war gaming for companies sounds uh, like a Pretty, pretty awesome uh, idea as well.

Speaker A: Well, you know, uh, one of the most important tasks of any organizations is to do assessments of what you're currently doing. I mean it feels good, you know, and this is the way we've always done it and, and we're doing pretty good as a company. Um, but does that mean, is it the best? Are you maximizing your efficiency, uh, and are we looking further down the road as well? I mean, what's coming? And this is where I imagine certain applications of artificial intelligence would help you do rapid assessment of. Where are you putting your emphasis on marketing, but where are you getting the most and why is that? Why does the place where you spend the most on marketing not resulting in the best, um, in the biggest profit? Are you in the wrong place or is it how you're doing it? Or is it the people at that place that are good or not? So doing the assessments. Um, I would always like to have that, uh, for the, you know, the famous um, um, bombing of the uh, Iranian nuclear sites, um, that the president, uh, Trump launched our air force to come in there and of course they claimed we obliterated it within hours. Uh, that's impossible. I mean nobody can do battle damage assessment that quickly. But you would want to know as quick as possible what was the assessment? And to get assessment of a target, do you have to go back and re. Attack, um, or do we do something different? Um, getting that what we call BDA battle damage assessment, uh, is important for working your way down your target list. Or um, do you have, did you do it with the right mix of weapons, the right tactic? Uh, how do you, how do you improve on that? So you know, I don't think too many people of your audience are interested in destroying physically their adversary. But assessing, assessing uh, maybe you want to crush them in opposition. Um, so assessing what you're doing, is it working? Any help you could get there would uh, I think be useful.

Speaker C: Yeah, 100%. Very often we've also network you ask. We think our competitors may be struggling at this moment, but we really have some data points but we really don't have a full picture. And this is sometimes important to also see whether it's a, markets or industry. Yeah, um, the, the one more topic we wanted to touch is obviously the current situation. So we're recording this end of September. Last week 19 uh, or so drones now flew into Poland. Uh, that, that's what we, we've, we've heard. Um, what's your, what's your assessment at the moment? I Mean, uh, Baltics, uh, Finland, uh, Poland, um, situation in the region. Um, how, how does the outlook for 2025, 2026 look in your mind?

Speaker A: So 21 drones landed in Poland. Um, none of them carried a warhead. So these were all, uh, drones that were designed to go a long distance, um, not to destroy a target. Uh, so clearly this is not an accident. There's 21 of them. None of them are armed. These were 21 that were sent to test our preparations, our defenses, our readiness. And I think the Russians will have taken from this that we are not ready. Now, credit to the Poles, the fact that the pilots that went up were authorized to shoot down drones, that was an important thing. Not everybody along NATO's eastern flank has the authorization to automatically shoot down, ah, a Russian drone that violates airspace. The problem is, um, the Ukrainians are laughing at us. You set up an F35 to shoot down a drone. I mean that's, you know, they face three or 400 a night and they get about 70 to 80% of them. We got three out of 21, um, using uh, F16s and F35s. So, um, that to me was, was very frustrating because we've been watching, you know, this war started 11 years ago and uh, now three and a half years after the large scale invasion and watching Ukraine, Ukrainians get pounded by drones night after night after night, and we still were not prepared. So, uh, a key to fixing this, you know, we talk about what happened, why did it happen, how do you fix it? A key is our political leaders being candid about Russia is at war with us. Even if we don't think we're at war with them, they are absolutely at war with us. Now uh, that doesn't mean that Iskander missiles are going to come flying into Riga or Gdansk or places like that, but all the other things that they're doing, it's part of testing to see how good are we at identification, our ah, reactions and so on. It also told me that, you know, there's almost 10,000American soldiers in Poland. Different places, um, excuse me, most of them are rotational, um, but nonetheless it's 10,000American troops, including some air force. And the Russians still launched 21 drones into Poland that told me that they do not respect, uh, US presence there because, you know, um, our president has been, uh, well, wishy washy. He's not followed through on any threat against Putin. So I think the Russians showed that as well. So what do we do about this? Uh, first of all, we need to Recognize that Russia is at war with us and we need to start looking at how do you counter or deter, uh, Russian actions in the so called gray zone. Um, there's airspace violations, um, GPS jamming of commercial aircraft out over the Baltic Sea, uh, this, uh, destruction of undersea cables and undersea pipelines. None of these are accidents. If it happened one time. Okay, Accident, when it happens so often. These are not accidents. Uh, I was in Latvia last year and I remember there was still. People were still angry about a Russian, uh, drone or missile had landed in some field in Levia.

Speaker C: Armed. Yeah. Um, yeah.

Speaker A: And so was that an accident? Who knows? The fact is the Russians are being, uh, are willing to shoot missiles close enough to the borders of NATO countries that maybe there is an accident. Uh, so they're, they're not interested in having their own sort of buffer to prevent that kind of accident. Um, and I think the last thing is, uh, these shadow fleet vessels, I mean three ships a day, a day loaded with Russian oil, sails out of the Baltic Sea, uh, from up around St. Petersburg, uh, down to their refinery ports there, um, out through the Danish straits. Why are we letting that happen? Now, I've spoken to a couple of guys, Danish, uh, people said this is international water. Okay, but you know what if these ships are, uh, all of them are described as end of life by the EU's sanctions, uh, envoy. They're all end of life. So that means these things are environmental catastrophes waiting to happen. Uh, they probably are not correctly insured. Uh, they're not following all the rules. So Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, you know, you have to protect your shores from environmental disaster. And we have to help stop, uh, Russia's export of oil, which is the only thing that allows them to keep, to stay in this war. Russia is not going to defeat Ukraine. That's not going to happen. They can't. They don't have the capability to break through and then exploit it the way their grandfathers did. You know, uh, in the second World War, that, that does not exist. All they can do is keep trying to wear down M and uh, kill innocent Ukrainians at night. Um, but it's uh, that oil export that goes to China, India, Turkey, Hungary, Slovakia. That's what keeps them in the war.

Speaker C: Or as I said, I mean like Danish strait or just one of those tankers go bust and then we have an environmental disaster. And what for, um, for the societies living on the eastern flank of NATO, any kind of. I know your perspective. Should we. Because, for example, a lot of our listeners are under 40. Uh, they grew up after Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. And we've seen pretty much good times until now. And we were building companies and building our careers and lives, and war was nothing really like our grandfathers and fathers have, you know. But, um, is this changing? You know, should we get more prepared? Should we get more, um. I don't know. Everybody goes to military service, everybody's prepared bunkers, all these things. Should we be considering that seriously?

Speaker A: Well, um, yes, absolutely, consider it seriously, because the Russians consider it seriously. Now, uh, that doesn't mean that everybody should go out in their backyard and start digging a giant bunker the way we did in the 50s and 60s in the U.S. uh, because there was so much fear of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. Um, but, uh, I would take a look at what the Finns do. I have a Finnish friend who told me, she said, ben, do you know why we are never scared? It's because we're always prepared. And, uh, here's a country that's got an enormous border with Russia and a small population, but yet they have a huge, they have more artillery than any other country in Europe. Um, on a very, very short notice, they can have a couple hundred thousand troops in the field under arms that have already had some training. So that's a system. And then meanwhile, you know, they have very successful businesses, startups, high tech industry, uh, and people still go on holidays and they still compete in the Olympics and, you know, hockey and all that. So it's not one or the other. Um, when it comes to conscription or mandatory service of some type, I, um, think this is, this is a question that only each nation can answer. What's best for your culture, your society, your demographics? Uh, what do you need? I personally, uh, believe that, uh, in America we lost something when we, when we moved away from the draft and had an all volunteer army, you get a very high quality, but we lost something of social cohesion. And I've heard, uh, you know, I live in Frankfurt and I've had heard Germans say the same thing, that, yes, nobody wanted to be, uh, wehrflicht, to be forced to join the Wundeswehr. But they acknowledged that the country lost something, a sense of ownership for what happened. Uh, I would say that if there was gonna be conscription, ah, that women would have to be included in that. Um, frankly, nowadays, uh, I'll just be honest. Uh, you know, the U.S. army is 20% female. Uh, I had less problems with female soldiers. They worked harder than male soldiers. And General speaking, when it came to tech things, they were much better. And so, uh, in the case of Latvia, for example, um, are women, women recruited, uh, to serve because they, they can kill a Russian just as well as a, a male, if that's what's required, or defend the country or whatever the task is. Now I, um, would say one last thing and just sort of topic is, um, you know, the, the geography of NATO's eastern flank. As you, as you guys know very well. I mean you've, from Poland you go up through this very narrow Suwalki gap, uh, and then to get to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. And so, um, that's a, that's a vulnerability for us. And it might be two weeks in a worst case scenario, um, if we got caught flat footed and Russia launches an attack, uh, into Lithuania or Latvia, for example, um, it might be two weeks before additional NATO forces arrived from somewhere else. And part, uh, of that's because the Russians know that our NATO's response depends on rapid reinforcement. So all the airports, seaports, rail, all those things would be targeted for destruction either by missiles or, or sabotage or cyber. And so what does that mean for um, civil society? You need to be thinking maybe even for two weeks, you know, before help, ground help arrives. Now the air force will be there immediately, but ground help. So, um, are the utilities, uh, water, electricity, uh, road repair, is that there? Are people prepared? Um, do you have the resilience? And I think again, uh, Finland, uh, is a good model. If the Russians see that you have all of that, I think they're a lot less likely to make a terrible decision.

Speaker C: All right, well, thank you very much, General for the commentary. I think, uh, we covered a lot. And um, um, to the listeners, please follow General Ben Hodges. Uh, he's um, commenting on a lot of issues and a lot of media and we've been very happy to also have him here today. Thank you guys and we'll see you in a week.

Speaker B: Thank you.

Speaker A: Thanks for the privilege. If you like this show, remember to leave us a rating or review. It helps other people to discover the pursuit of scrappiness.