#388 Who's Minding the Money? The Role of Competition Authorities in Digital Finance

Speaker A: Welcome to our Cureus Amalgam, the weekly podcast brought to you by the Antitrust Law section of the American Bar Association. Our curious amalgam explores the fascinating and increasingly overlapping world of competition, consumer protection, data protection and privacy law. Each week we bring you leading global experts on the most compelling issues of the day. Enjoy the show.

Speaker B: Hello and welcome to our curious and Malcolm, the podcast from the American Bar association and a trust line section. My name is Anora Wan. Today's topic is who is minding the Money? The role of competition authorities in digital finance. Joining me today is my co host, Lexi Michaud.

Speaker C: Hi Lexi.

Speaker D: Hi Anora.

Speaker B: Who would be our guest of honor today? Would you please do the introduction?

Speaker D: I, uh, would love to. So today we have with us Beatrice Marquez, a competition expert in the OECD Competition Division where she works on competition policy issues across a range of sectors that also include digital markets and financial services. Before joining the oecd, Beatrice served as an Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust Bureau of the New York State Attorney General where she investigated and litigated complex antitrust matters. She has extensive experience at, uh, the intersection of competition law, regulation, digital innovation. And since joining the oecd, she has contributed to the Competition Committee's long term focus on competition in financial services, including background notes and roundtables on competition in mobile payment services and on balancing prudential regulation and competition considerations in banking. She also has ongoing work on competition in capital markets. So we'll link some of that work in the episode notes, so be sure to check that out. And we're delighted to have Beatrice join us to share her insights on how competition authorities can help ensure that digital financial markets remain open, innovative and competitive. Welcome to the show, Beatrice.

Speaker C: Thank you so much for having me. Lexian. Andora, I'm so delighted to be here with you today. I'm such a fan of the podcast and allow me m just to start with the usual disclosure language that all of my comments today do not represent the views of the OECD or any of its members.

Speaker B: Well, pleasure of having you is all ours. We'll kick off the topic basically with a very broad question. Why has competition in digital financial services become such an important issue for competition authorities around the world?

Speaker C: Sure. So digital financial services have become a priority for competition authorities because, uh, digitization is unbundling retail banking. So retail banking was traditionally built around a single integrated relationship controlled by one provider. Think about payments, deposits, lending and the entire consumer interface that was typically provided by a bank. So digitization has opened that Relationship. For new entrants we see entry from big tech and fintechs, for example, which now compete on specific parts of the value chain. And this has certainly delivered many benefits across many markets, including better user experience and faster payments and more personalized services as well as broader access. But this unbundling of banking is not necessarily translating into durable competitive pressure. So we see that many new entrants still depend on incumbents to provide core services. So they might for example, need a bank partner in order to access retail level payment rails or in order to provide regulated services such as take deposit taking. So they might also face a couple new digital bottlenecks, including say, access to data or access to mobile operating systems, app stores and digital wallets. So as a result, the market might look a little bit more competitive at the surface for consumers who see more brands, more apps, more wallets and generally more digital services. But beneath the surface, incumbent banks, card networks as well as these new digital gatekeepers might control the critical infrastructures that determine whether rivals can enter and um, scale and as well as on what terms they might be able to do so. So across jurisdictions we're actually still seeing signs that this competitive pressure is not fully reaching customers. Pass, ah, through of uh, both lending and deposit interest rates for consumers can be slow and narrow as well as incomplete. And in retail banking markets, switching generally remains limited, even where better offers are available. So for competition authorities, the key question is whether unbundling is making retail banking more open and contestable and delivering competition benefits to consumers. And um, this is why this is now a key issue central not only to enforcement, but also to advocacy and generally cooperation with financial regulators.

Speaker B: So that's certainly a lot of grounds to cover and certainly not everything is changing at the same pace. Perhaps you can tell us maybe what parts of the financial sector that's changing the most or the fastest.

Speaker C: Yeah, that's a great question. So I think that generally where changes are taking place fastest is where the consumer meets the new service. So the consumer interface and I think payments are really the clearest example. They're embedded in everyday digital activity. And um, consumers might not really be changing bank accounts often, but they have changed how they pay. So this makes payments kind of a natural first point of entry for new providers. And let me just ask both of you, did either of you tap to pay for a coffee with your phone today? I mean I know I did, but

Speaker B: I tapped and paid for something today.

Speaker D: Even the subway on the way to work, right is how that's how we use it now.

Speaker C: Exactly. So you know, that simple tap of a phone or that checkout click can really determine which firms control the consumer relationship and which payment instrument is used, as well as what data is generated or which providers can build services around that transaction. And a similar dynamic is emerging in data enabled lending, including for the increasing adoption of Buy Now, Pay later or bnpl. So BNPL is quite interesting because it embeds credit directly into the payment flow, so it does not necessarily compete with banks across the full credit relationship. It competes at the point of sale where merchant integration and the interface visibility or transaction level data, as well as the convenience to the customer are really key dimensions of competition as much as those traditional credit terms. So the fastest change is not necessarily in deposit taking or lending intermediation itself. It is at the edges of that banking relationship through payments and um, transaction based credit. So those areas again can generate real competitive benefits, including better user experience and more target services as well as new forms of entry. But they do not always create that direct head to head competition with deposit taking banks. So payments and data enabled lending are changing very quickly. But the deeper competition question is whether that entry for those channels becomes a pathway to scaling and enduring competition, or whether these challenges might remain confined to these narrow layers of the value chain dependent on pretty much the same incumbents that they're seeking to intermediate.

Speaker B: That's fascinating. And we just mentioned about tap and pay and that's example of technologies. It's foreseeable or plausible that digital technologies can lower barriers to entry and maybe increase competition at the edges of retail banking. Perhaps like not all the same networks, the incumbent competitors are the ones that have the digital technologies especially. They're now so much more available now. But in the meanwhile, are there new forms of concentration actually emerging with these widespread technologies?

Speaker C: Thank you, that's a great question. I would say yes, new forms of concentration are certainly emerging and particularly around digital ecosystems and those key technology interfaces. So take mobile payments again as an example. Competition is increasingly shaped by the access to the consumer device and the related key input. So that could include mobile operating systems or app stores, digital wallets, even APIs and authentication or default settings can all become key inputs that rivals need to compete effectively and really reach the consumer. So let me just give you a key particular example and that's near field communications or nfc. Going back to what we were discussing, that's the technology that enables the tap to pay. So if one firm controls access to the NFC on a, um, mobile device, it can affect whether arrival wallet or app provider could have the same smooth tap to pay experience when buying that coffee or otherwise. And the European Commission's Apple Pay case is a useful example of exactly enforcement at this layer. So the concern was that Apple restricted rival mobile wallets access to NFC on iPhones for in store contactless payments. And in practice that meant that Apple uh, was the only mobile device able to offer NFC based tap to pay functionalities on iPhone. So Apple's uh, commitments following an investigation which were made legally binding in 2024, open access to NFC functionality for rival wallet providers across the European economic area. And indeed today we see so much entry within the Apple ecosystem where I'm able to use rival mobile providers here from Paris. And the first entrant was Bits mobile Pay. And we already see that they're scaling and offering more services. So I think that's a great example of really important competition enforcement that has led to so many consumer benefits, being a consumer myself here out of the ea. But another kind of related example also comes out of the US we have the ongoing case against Apple which shows how wallet access can also fit within that broader ecosystem theory. So digital wallets are one of the areas where DOJ points to uh, Apple restricting technologies that could reduce user lock in or make rival services more viable. It's not necessarily a payments case, it's a broader smartphone monopolization case. So um, that's going to be really interesting to watch. The complaint survived the motion to dismiss in June 2025 and the case is ongoing. So I guess the broader point is that digitalization has enabled entry, but it's also created really key gateways to consumers and therefore new gatekeepers. So a digital payment provider may have a better product, but it still needs access to that device or digital environment where consumers can actually make the payment choices. So for competition authorities this means that they need to not only look at whether entry is possible, but whether these new entrants can reach consumers in fair and effective terms inside these ecosystems where payment choices are being made.

Speaker D: Beatrice, when you talk about competitive advantages, where my mind goes is data. So obviously a lot of people refer to data as the currency of the digital economy. I'm curious to know what role you think that access to customer data plays in financial services, in competition in financial services.

Speaker C: I think that's a great place for your mind to go, Lexi, because data certainly plays a central role to determine whether a firm can reach and price and serve consumers in the right way that will be attractive to them. And we see transaction data or account data, uh, as well as Things like repayment history or income patterns or spending behavior that can all affect how these new providers are assessing risk, offering credit, or designing products that target consumers. So on the one hand, you know that access to data can promote competition where it allows new entrants to overcome the information advantage that was long held by incumbent banks and card networks. For example, take a bank that has held customer data for years. They would have a richer picture of what that customer's financial behavior is like, and they would certainly have that data advantage over say, a new lending or payments provider. But if a customer can securely share that information with a rival, then the arrival might be able to offer a better product, a better rate or a more tailored service. So let's kind of what I'd say is the pro competitive promise of open banking. But data can also limit competition when it's concentrated or if it's difficult to access or control by firms that also compete downstream. So in mail payments and data enabled lending, I'd say that this is especially important once more because that uh, data can improve underwriting, so that assessment of creditworthiness and product design. But it can also create competitive advantages for firms that control the customer interface if they are hoarding that data. So again, BNPL is a really good example because those providers are competing at that point of sale based on that transaction level data. And that data is really the key input that makes them make those really fast credit decisions at uh, the checkout. So if access to consumers or merchants and their data is controlled by a small number of platforms or payment intermediaries, then the ability to scale really might depend as much on the access to the ecosystems and the relevant data as much as on the quality of the credit product. So again, it can be pretty competitive if it reduces information asymmetries and allows customers to bring that financial history to competing providers. But it can really create competition bottlenecks where data advantages become really difficult to replicate, or if access is discriminatory, or if firms use that control over data, uh, to reinforce that moat over the customer relationship. So the key point I think is that data mobility can support customer mobility if customers can safely share that data. And it becomes really easier for rivals to compete for them. But if they cannot, then incumbents can really retain that customer even if they don't have the best offers or the best prices, simply because of that data control.

Speaker D: I want to go back to something you said, which is open banking. So from my understanding, open banking is one of the most significant regulatory developments in recent years, according to some and I want to know from you, has it really delivered on in the name, has it delivered on its promise, open banking and what lessons have we learned so far when it comes to competition and the effect open banking has had?

Speaker C: Thank you Lexi, that's a great question. So, okay, I would say that open banking has generally delivered on that promise to promote competition, especially by giving consumers that greater control over their financial data and allowing.

Speaker D: Maybe I can actually pause you and just in 15, 20 seconds just tell everyone what open banking is. Because I have to admit, I myself don't even know if I could really define open banking.

Speaker C: Yes, absolutely, with pleasure. So open banking is a mix of um, data portability as well as potentially interoperability, depending how APIs are designed. But generally it's considered a um, pro competitive data portability remedy. What it allows is for consumers to opt, say what new non bank financial providers might be able to access their banking data in order to execute say payments or other authorized services. So it's allowing that data with proper consumer consent to go from an incumbent controlled moat toward that new provider and really enabling those services. And since the adoption of open banking, which really started out of the UK competition authorities retail banking remedy, we have seen so much new entry in these services, including payment and now lending and otherwise thanks to open banking. I hope I kind of provided a good picture of open banking, Lexi.

Speaker D: No, absolutely. I mean I'm picturing myself on my phone accepting to share my data whenever I do something like this and not thinking twice about it because it's so convenient. But it's helpful to know what's going on in the background.

Speaker C: Exactly. So that data uh, enables that switching behavior and just maybe to give you a little bit more background of open banking. So it started as this novel data portability remedy by the Competition Authority in the uk following that retail banking market investigation where the authority found adverse effects on competition and namely that there was limited customer mobility which was weakening entry and switching. So the competition origin in my mind really matters because this UK open banking model is relatively prescriptive. So it did not simply say banks should share data, it specified common technical standards. And this is where I was talking about interoperability and how it might depend. These standards for APIs helped avoid a standard battle and really accelerated adoption across the UK. If we compare the UK with the EU, which took a different path, uh, in the EU, the Second Payment Services Directive, which we refer to as PSD2 established that regulatory foundation for open banking. So this is not a competition authority led initiative. It's A regulatory initiative and it required banks to and other account providers to grant that authorized third party access to that payment account data with the customer's consent. But it was less prescriptive than the UK's approach so it did not make a common API standard in the same way and it created more variation and implementation and in some cases problems around the API quality and reliability and access. So that's one of the reasons that there's actually a proposal still not adopted as of July 2026 but that looks very likely, which is the EU's third Payment Service Directive and um, a related payment services regulation. And these proposals are really quite important because they reflect lessons from PSD2 which is that uh, legal access to that data through open banking is not enough. So access has to be functional and reliable and timely and not really undermined by technical obstacles. Imagine like see if you're but clicking to give that consent but the data gets there so much later that you can't really execute that payment or otherwise you might not want to switch to that provider ultimately. So the US also shows a different model. It has historically been more of a market led approach with data developing through private arrangements. So this led to substantial adoption but also to kind of inconsistency in terms and scope and the mechanics of access. There was a CFPP Personal Data Right proposal to move forward to a slightly more formal framework, but its future currently remains uncertain. Other jurisdictions generally sit along the spectrum where some rely on regulatory mandates, others use guidance or API playbooks or rely on market led arrangements. So generally open banking can reduce information asymmetries and make it easier for consumers to receive offers from competing providers. But it does not by itself eliminate consumer inertia. So I guess I'll say it has delivered on its promise, but it's a qualified yes it has because consumers are still facing really tough search and switching costs and we see that mobility remains low even where consumers could earn as aforementioned, better interest rates or giving rise and, or yes giving rise to better lending or deposit rates. And I don't know if you've heard this before, but there's an adage that came out of the UK after this open banking market study and remedy which is that consumer is more likely to divorce than to switch bank accounts. So banking, it needs to be paired with additional tools that make switching easier and more attractive in practice. And this could include say better comparison tools or clear disclosures, simplified switching services, which is something the UK has also let on or prompts that help consumers act on better offers and Rules that reduce that bundling or make adjacent services more portable. So I think the key point is that data mobility can really support competition, as does open banking, but it's not the same as customer mobility. So open banking creates a possibility for rivals to compete, but the next step is really to make sure that consumers can actually understand, trust and act on those alternatives. Divorcing their bank accounts.

Speaker D: That's a great, that's a great comparison, Beatrice. Well, let's dig into that a little bit. So one theme that you keep bringing up in your responses is the relationship between traditional banks and fintech firms, big tech companies. So how do you see those competitive dynamics actually evolving?

Speaker C: Thank you Lexi. Another really great question. I think this relationship is increasingly defined by both competition and dependency. So turning more into cooperation as opposed to competition in some senses, um, because fintechs and big techs might compete with banks at the edges, as we were discussing earlier, of the retail banking supply chain. But many challengers are still relying on incumbent banks and car networks for the infrastructure that allows the services to work. And across most jurisdictions payments really do rely on those bank centric and card based retail level payment rails. So okay, retail payment rail think about, I like to think about it at least like train tracks, actual train tracks that determine the route that say a uh, freight train might follow in order to deliver goods. Retail level payment rails define how payment instructions flow. So they're central to the processing and clearing and settlement of retail payment transactions between the customer and the merchant. So if you imagine say a sleek new train running on incumbent control tracks, that track is still shaping where the train can go, what it costs to run it and what kind of innovation is possible. So the effects on this infrastructure control are really not neutral. Many challengers also depend on partnerships with incumbent banks both for access to this financial infrastructure and to offer regulated services. So a, uh, fintech might for example provide that app or wallet that all of us see when we tap to pay our phone. But many m mobile payments are still relying on that bank account or credit card or debit card as ah, the underlying payment instrument. So in that model the mobile wallet is the interface. But the funds used to execute the transaction are not held within the wallet or app. Instead they're being passed through to the underlying card or bank account and the transaction is still again running on those incumbent controlled retail payment rails. And just to give you an example, Apple Pay and Google Pay are examples of these pass through payments that rely on banks and card networks for the underlying payment instruments. So those partnerships certainly can enable new entry and can create efficiencies, but they can also steer innovation, limit the intensity of competition and prevent scaling across retail banking markets. So for a competition perspective, they blur the boundary between competition and cooperation. A challenger could compete with the incumbent at the front end, while it's really relying on the very incumbent it seeks to disintermediate to provide these very services. And also from a prudential perspective, it can blur the regulatory perimeter and really complicate oversight. So the concern I think is that partnerships can help entrench income and banks or card networks rather than enabling that independent entry, that scaling and um, that eventual head to head competition across retail banking markets.

Speaker B: So the question we have in the title is who is minding the money? So who is one of the key word here. So financial services we know at traditionally heavily regulated for important reasons, right? Like consumer protection, like financial stability. So who other than the competition authorities have to be working alongside? Right, and perhaps with the financial regulators. How can they work together without having these sort of like different objectives coming into conflict?

Speaker C: Thank you. So yeah, let me start by saying that financial services are not ordinary markets. So banks hold household savings and provide credit and facilitate payments and they're connected to the broader economy. So prudential regulation is needed to protect consumers and preserve confidence and reduce those systemic risks. So generally we do have financial regulators and credential regulators, central banks, as well as competition authorities, and maybe even consumer protection authorities, data authorities and otherwise involved in ensuring these markets are contestable and competitive. But coming back to prudential regulation, which I think, at least from a competition perspective, can kind of really have a lot of effects on the structure of a market and how feasible competition is. I'd say maybe let me back up and just say that prudential safeguards are absolutely key and should certainly not be weakened for the reasons we discussed about preserving confidence and reducing systemic risk. But a question that from a competition perspective, I think is very important is for prudential regulators to ask how prudential rules can be designed and implemented in a way that both preserves stability, which is a very important objective, while also preserving contestability. And um, there certainly can be tensions between the competition perspective and the prudential perspective. Take competition where entry and expansion are important because they constrain incumbents and create those incentives for lower prices, quality and improved innovation. While from a prudential perspective, authorities might rightly be concerned about what entrants are coming into these markets and whether they're undercapitalized or poorly supervised or built around fragile business models. That said, I think that the objectives can really be complementary. Well designed prudential regulations can really support competition by building trust and creating a stable environment in which entrants can grow. And um, on the other hand, competition can also support prudential goals. It can improve efficiency, it can strength strengthen governance incentives, and it can also reduce and um, I think this is quite important, the risk stemming from too big to fail dynamics. So I think this is where cooperation between authorities really becomes important. Competition authorities can help identify the structural barriers or competition risks that might be coming up and also ask whether rules are unintentionally favoring incumbents or particular business models and thus whether they should be calibrated with competition objectives in mind. And um, I think, let me just highlight that we do see a couple different models across jurisdictions that have enhanced cooperation, uh, between prudential regulators and competition authorities. And Israel is a recent example where they created an inter ministerial committee to advance banking competition. And it brings together the competition Authority, the Central bank, the Finance Ministry and others. Spain had an initiative by the competition authority, the cnmc, that recommended a regulatory sandbox to support innovation and brings together multiple perspectives. Portugal has also really developed sustained cooperation between the Competition Authority and the bank of Portugal across advocacy and also in enforcement as well as supervision is also kind of a leading example in my mind where they've been really active in cooperating with financial regulators and um, providing that advocacy through market studies and regular contact with the financial regulators as to why, to really keep competition in mind. So I think the broader point is that cooperation can really be informal or formal. It can happen through committees or sandboxes or market studies. But what's really key is that regular dialogue and that uh, we're all learning from each other.

Speaker B: Sounds like you already predicted. My next question, which is like there are so many areas and with challenges for competition authorities and other regulators and like with existing policy tools that they use, perhaps their success and like areas that's still progressing. And the particular areas that you think that offer especially useful lessons for policymakers would be what? Are there anything that, like, I know you just made a long list, but like, if there's one, one, one or two most important things that you can highlight, what would that be?

Speaker C: So, okay, top of mind, I think that the partnership issue that we just discussed can really benefit from that cooperation. We see that if the prudential parameter is too rigid, new entrants might be pushed toward these partnerships with incumbent banks. And at the same time it could enable entry but it's limiting that independent competition. So a potential response are tiered prudential regimes. And the idea is generally to create kind of a scaled pathway between being fully outside of the prudential perimeter versus becoming a full service bank from day one and Mexico. Here is a useful example. So Mexico has a tiered prudential framework for non bank financial institutions. So the idea is that just generally non bank providers are able to extend payment and credit services without a license or authorization. And that's true for most jurisdictions provided that they don't accept deposits. So if they want to mobilize retail deposits in Mexico, they can apply for what's called a uh, popular financial license or sofipo. And this is what allows deposit taking and basic financial services under prudential supervision. But it's less burdensome than say a full bank license. So what it does is it kind of creates a practical on ramp. A firm can start without lower risk activity, build a customer base and eventually move into regulated activities as it scales with stronger safeguards applying as the risks are increasing. And in Mexico because of this scaled prudential perimeter, we saw Nubank for example, that entered through this trajectory. It started as a lender, it then expanded into payments and it eventually got that SOFIPO license in order to provide deposits. And after having provided these services under sofipo, it has now applied for a full banking license. And we have some um, fintech providers such as CLAR and STORY in Mexico that have also followed similar trajectory. So we see the benefits of this scaled regime. So I think the competition point is that this kind of framework can really reduce dependence on incumbent banks to offer these regulated services. And it's giving entrants a, um, pathway to scale as independent competitors rather than remaining permanently dependent or at ah, the edge of the market. So just to flag that, we see a couple other proportional prudential regimes though with other designs across other jurisdictions. India for example, has a scale based framework for non bank financial companies. Brazil also has kind of a segmentation approach that reflects also that idea that credential requirements can become more demanding as firms become larger and more complex, their services become more risky or as uh, they become more systematically important. So I think that the broader lesson is that there's many good examples of how credential regulation can be designed with competition and scaling in mind.

Speaker D: Beatrice, to start to wrap things up on the substantive portion of, I'm going to ask you to look five years ahead and think about the competition issues in digital financial services that you think deserve more attention and that aren't currently receiving the attention that you think they warrant.

Speaker C: Okay, allow um, me to focus on three issues and let me start with AI, because what would any conversation be without mentioning AI exactly? The first is that opportunity from AI. So you know, many of the problems that we were discussing earlier, those demand side competition problems that relate back to that consumer inertia, not wanting to divorce from bank accounts. Well, and the fact that consumers are not switching even where better products are available here agenda particularly could potentially help address that. So if it's used well, it's envisioned that AI tools could help consumers to understand their financial position and compare products more easily, identify better offers and just act on them more easily. So it could really make those demand side competition issues more effective because consumers would be better able to search and compare and switch. And there's a really interesting study by the UK Financial Conduct Authority, it's called the Mills Review, that really looks at how AI could shape competition by 2030. And it talks about these more personalized services and that greater consumer engagement that agentic AI could enable. Of course it also very much raises the risks about explainability and bias and trust and the boundary between guidance and regulated advice. So I think this is something to watch. Whether AI becomes a tool that is empowering consumers or it could also become another layer of intermediation that concentrates influence over consumer choice. From a competition perspective. I think a second key issue is partnerships. I think partnerships between banks and fintechs and big techs are going to continue to be really important. And um, again they can support entry and innovation, but they can really also entrench dependency. So I think authorities will likely be paying closer attention to other partnerships are the only pathway to entry and scaling. And then I think the third issue, and it's something we haven't discussed yet, so let's put it on the radar, is acquisitions of potential competitors. So in digital finance, a firm might be, might not yet be that direct competitor, but it might be building the data or the technology or the customer relationship or even the infrastructure that could one day become a competitive threat over time. And the Visa, um, DOJ investigation really comes to mind as a good previous competition enforcement on this front. So it was in 2020 that the DOJ challenged Visa's proposed acquisition of Plaid on um, the theory that Plaid would become a disruptive alternative to Visa's online debit services. The deal was ultimately abandoned, so there's no final merits ruling. But the case really remains an important example of why authorities need to look at Future competition and dynamic competition, and not only at current overlap. So I think the broader point is that competition in digital financial services will increasingly depend not only on enabling entry and switching, but also on enabling those pathways to scale and, um, preserving the potential competitors that might, uh, disintermediate incumbents. So, AI partnerships and acquisitions, I think all kind of raise the same underlying question. Are the new technologies and business models opening markets, or are they being absorbed or reinforcing existing structures and market power?

Speaker B: All of this has been fascinating. I definitely would think twice when I tap or pay or check, like, any box that. To share information about my banking info. Thanks a lot for this round of conversation, Beatrice. Thank you. But we do not want to let you go yet. We want to take advantage of having you here to give our audience an opportunity to learn about you as a person a little better. So could you please just shift gear a little bit? Tell us just one thing that people might not know about you if they had only known or worked with you professionally.

Speaker C: So, okay. I'm a keen scuba diver. So much so that my husband proposed to me underwater. Uh, it took me a while to understand what was happening, but I eventually got it and said yes by nodding. Underwater, huh? You do?

Speaker D: Yeah.

Speaker B: You cannot have too many verbal communications there.

Speaker C: There was no need for a proposal, but at first I thought, did he find this ring underwater? Why is his buoyancy so poor? Until I finally got it, and where even to hide the ring?

Speaker B: Right when you go down, you don't

Speaker C: have much extra space. So it was tied to his wetsuit. And, um, I managed to put it on and then had to give it back before doing a cave dive.

Speaker D: Honestly, hat tip to him, because I feel like a proposal is already stressful enough for whoever is doing the proposal, that this is just an added layer of stress for your husband.

Speaker C: He did not lose the ring. Neither did I. So we survived.

Speaker B: Wonderful.

Speaker D: So, Beatrice, we like to end the show with one more question about you, which we call Curious hat.

Speaker A: Uh, and now it's time for the Curious hat.

Speaker D: So my question for you today is, I know you worked for some time in New York, and now you're working in Paris, where the OECD is. I want to settle this once and for all. Which city has the better museums?

Speaker C: Hardest question I've ever been asked. Okay. Paris has a slight edge, but only because there is an ongoing Calder exhibit at, uh, the Louis Vuitton foundation, which I found was the best curated exhibit I have ever seen, ever. And Calder also happens to be my absolute favorite mobilist I will say so Paris has an edge, but New York is really not far behind.

Speaker B: Well, talking at a larger scale, like the open banking, you gradually opening up. So maybe Paris has the little bit of advantage of being the incumbent of the cultural capital for the world for a long time. And New York is really catching up in the past.

Speaker C: I'd say century.

Speaker B: So we'll be there someday.

Speaker C: I like a good challenger story.

Speaker D: I love that we just asked to predict five years into the future what you think the most important topics in competition in digital financial services are. But museums in Paris versus New York is a harder question.

Speaker C: It certainly is.

Speaker B: All right, thank you for this wonderful conversation and we've learned a great deal. And thank you listeners and viewers for joining us for this wonderful conversation. And Lexi, thanks as always for being a great co host.

Speaker C: Thank you as well, Nora. Thank you so much for having me. This has been so much fun. Thank you Beatrice.

Speaker D: This was great.

Speaker A: Thank you for listening to this week's episode of our Cureus Amalgam, a competition Consumer protection, Data Protection and Privacy Law podcast. It is produced and shared around the globe by ABA's antitrust law section. The opinions expressed by the participants in this podcast are their own and do not necessarily represent their employer or other organizations. If you like what you heard or would like to become a member of the American and Bar association, please check out what the Antitrust Section has to offer@ambar.org antitrust. You can learn more about our podcast atour curious amalgam.com. if you have comments, suggestions or podcast ideas, please reach out to us@podcastourcuriousamalgam.com until next time, thank you for listening.