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Defense Innovation Project - Michael Groen

The Business of Data Podcast · 2025-09-10 · 47 min

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General Groen frames defense modernization not as a weapons problem but as a cultural and strategic imperative driven by rapid transformation in geopolitical competition and technology. The core issue is DoD's compliance-based bureaucratic culture, built for industrial-age warfare, that cannot adapt to the speed of modern threats - particularly from China's rapid AI integration and Ukraine's operational agility. Groen contrasts this with a performance culture that emphasizes rapid iteration, cross-organizational collaboration, and continuous feedback loops between war fighters and technologists. He argues that dropping commercial technology or "tech bros" into the Pentagon without restructuring warfighting processes is insufficient; instead, expertise must flow bidirectionally between operators who understand battlefield dynamics and engineers who can code solutions. The integration challenge isn't technological - sensors, shooters, and all-domain coordination systems largely exist - but organizational and cultural. Groen advocates for moving from platform-centric acquisition (where services buy systems then figure out integration) to process-driven capability development where war fighters articulate operational problems and technologists enable rapid solutions. This requires dismantling organizational tribalism and shifting from viewing technology as replacement to viewing it as amplification of human decision-making and warfighting agility.

Key takeaways

  • →The Pentagon operates under a compliance culture inherited from 1950s industrial-age thinking, while peer competitors like China have adopted performance cultures that iterate rapidly and adapt to adversary weaknesses.
  • →Effective AI and technology integration requires deep, sustained collaboration between war fighters who understand operational flow and technologists, not merely inserting commercial solutions or contractors into existing processes.
  • →Real competitive advantage comes from process innovation and warfighting creativity - setting cascading dilemmas for the enemy through integrated technology - not from individual weapons or platforms.
  • →DoD must shift from platform-centric acquisition (buy systems, then integrate) to process-centric capability development where operational concepts drive technology selection and employment.
  • →Tribalism across service branches and organizational silos prevents data sharing and cross-functional innovation that could accelerate adaptive warfighting capabilities.

Guests

Lieutenant General Mike Groen

Topics in this episode

Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC)All-domain coordination (multi-domain operations)CJC2 (minimum viable capability)Anduril (defense technology contractor)Ukraine conflict (warfighting innovation model)Compliance culture vs. performance cultureAI integration in military operationsDefense acquisition system reformOrganizational tribalism in DoDProcess-driven warfighting concepts

Questions this episode answers

What does General Groen mean by the 'crisis of implementation' in defense modernization?

The crisis of implementation refers to DoD's failure to execute on existing innovations and capabilities, rooted in a compliance culture and bureaucratic processes inherited from the industrial age that cannot match the tempo of modern technological change and peer competitor adaptation.

Why is moving from a compliance culture to a performance culture critical for defense innovation?

A compliance culture focuses on following established procedures and regulations, while a performance culture prioritizes achieving objectives and adapting rapidly to new threats - essential for operating at the speed of peer competitors like China and responding to dynamic battlefields like Ukraine.

How should the Department of Defense approach partnerships with commercial technology companies and disruptors?

Rather than simply contracting large language models or parachuting technologists into the Pentagon, DoD must establish purposeful, sustained interaction between commercial technologists and military war fighters to jointly develop warfighting processes that integrate technology as amplification rather than replacement of human decision-making.

What role do legacy platform-centric acquisition approaches play in slowing defense modernization?

Platform-centric acquisition treats technology as pre-built systems that services purchase and then attempt to integrate later, preventing the tight feedback loops between operational concepts and technology development needed for rapid, adaptive warfighting in the AI age.

What is the Jurassic Park method of warfighting that General Groen describes?

It's a warfighting approach that creates cascading dilemmas for the enemy through integrated technology and surveillance - every direction an adversary moves presents a new threat or disadvantage, requiring disciplined processes to out-cycle and outmaneuver opponents rather than rely on individual weapons superiority.

Conversation analysis

Computed from the transcript - who did the talking, and the words that came up most.

Share of words spoken

  • Speaker B80%
  • Speaker A20%

Most-used words

technology28culture28defense22today22important21innovation17fighting17system16transformation15thank15tech14environment14capability14changing14build13process13

Episode notes

In this episode of the Defense Innovation Podcast, Corinium's Linda Lastovych sits down with Lieutenant General (Ret’d) Michael Groen, former Director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) at the U.S. Department of Defense. They explore the critical role of AI in modern military operations, the challenges of implementing cutting-edge technologies at scale, and the strategies required to foster innovation within large defense organizations. General Groen shares insights from his experience leading the JAIC, including lessons learned on collaboration between the DoD, industry, and academia, and how AI is reshaping decision-making, readiness, and operational capabilities. This conversation offers a unique perspective on driving technological change while maintaining mission-critical security and operational integrity. Whether you’re a defense professional, technologist, or policy enthusiast, this episode provides a front-row seat to the future of AI and innovation in national security.

Full transcript

47 min

Transcribed and scored by The B2B Podcast Index.

Speaker A: Foreign. To the Defense Innovation Project, a podcast for the thinkers and doers shaping the future of national security. This podcast explores what transformation really looks like inside the defense enterprise. From breakthrough technologies and policy shifts to the leaders who are pushing modernization beyond the PowerPoint deck and into practice. In each episode, we bring you strategic conversations with people building, leading and executing the future of defense. And today's guest is Lieutenant General Mike Groen. General Groen is one of the foremost voices in defense innovation today. The thinker endure himself, he brings a wealth of operational insight and strategic leadership to the conversation. With over 36 years of experience, General um Groen drove the transformation of US joint war fighting. Most recently, he served as, uh, the Director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence center, where he led DoD's efforts to integrate AI into the fabric of military operations. Before that, he was Director of Joint Staff Intelligence and earlier Director of Marine Corps Intelligence. And over the course of his decorated career, he's been at the center of key modernization efforts, working across cyber intelligence and operations to drive strategic change from within. Today, Mike leads his own consultancy, Grow and Tech, where he advises on AI implementation strategy. Um, he's also a defense advisor at the special Competitive Cities project, working to strengthen America's long term technological competitiveness. And in this episode, we explore what Mike has called the crisis of implementation. And this is a dialogue about modernization under pressure, leadership and complexity, and the mindset it takes to move faster than the threat. So let's get into it. Um, Gerald Groen, it's a true honor to have you here with us today. Thank you so much for joining. Um, it's always a great pleasure to have someone with such a wide and wealth of knowledge and experience. So thank you so much for being with us today.

Speaker B: Yeah, hey, thank you so much, Linda. Uh, I guess we'll see about the wisdom part later. Ah, congratulations to you, uh, and corinium, uh, for starting this podcast. I think it's a really, it's a much needed dialogue in the national security space. There are others to be sure, but I think there's some really important things that nuances that get missed in the general conversation. So really, really happy for you and the team for, for pulling this podcast together. Um, I'd also just say since I think this is our initial, our initial issue, um, that, uh, thanks to the listeners here because I think, you know, the people that are going to show up to this podcast, uh, they have lots of other venues to listen to, but these are the people that are going to be passionate about defense and passionate about national security and they want to help and they want to be part of the dialogue and they want to know what people are thinking and what people are doing inside the Pentagon and elsewhere inside uh, the intelligence community. So I think this is a really important podcast that fits a great niche and uh, really happy to be here with you Linda.

Speaker A: Yeah, thank you so much Mike. And um, you're a really fantastic voice to set the scene and um, be our guest in this first episode. And this is exactly kind of the purpose of this podcast is to shed some light on what's happening inside the Pentagon and um, really encourage um, our leaders to listen and go, go ahead and maybe read, read some more articles and um, expand their knowledge and uh, uh, dive deep into some of these topics that we'll uncover today and in the episodes that will follow. Um, so I wanted to start us off with talking about the current threat environment, um, where things are. So what we're really seeing is adversaries, um, like China, uh, develop capability at increasingly rapid pace and arguably um, China has been able to integrate AI enabled technologies across domains with fewer barriers to innovation. So, so from your perspective, um, what's really at stake for the US we fail to modernize quickly and effectively.

Speaker B: Great. I think so at core, I think there are two really dual challenges that we have. And I could spit out a list of countries that don't like us or what have you. I could talk about the current political environment and sort of a degradation of um, us uh interests or us uh, you know, dominance of the uh, defense ecosystem. I, I could, I don't want to start there though because I do think that like what's, what, what are really important. I, I, I would, I would put it in two words, competition and transformation. Right. And so, so, and, and both of these things are changing so radically. Right? So competition, you know, with, with a relative decline of US Dominance of uh, especially the military sphere, but also the geopolitical sphere. You know, now it's a much more fragmented environment. And so that competition, you know, it's a national competition, it's a military competition, it's also a technological competition. And we'll talk more about the technological competition. But, but I think the, the thing to anchor on here is look, people are competing against us in ways that they were not competing against us before. So that's kind of like point number one with uh, with competition. But, but like underneath that or next to that is transformation. And this is also like really important because not only is the geopolitical environment changing but we're changing, right? Our technology is changing, and that technology is society changing technology. So like, we're in this place of, of rapid transformation. And you can go back to, you know, know, sort of the start of the digital age and see a parallel there, the start of the Internet age, and you'll see a parallel there. You know, you can go back even further in history and see lessons from, uh, you know, uh, industrial warfare. But we're in one of those transformational moments and I think when, uh, and so, and so are our competitors. So like where we may have been comfortable, uh, leader in one place or another or one sphere of technology or another, so suddenly we're not anymore. And I call that transformation because transformation means transform, means the form changes, right? Transform. So the form is changing, right? So the way we fight is changing, the way we build institutions is changing. And the nature of our threats is changing too, right? And so now, you know, of course, it's not just China. And you know, we anchor today on things like our competition with, and our things, uh, you know, that, that are relevant to the Ukraine and Russian, uh, conflict, uh, right now, like we anchor on those, but it is much broader than that, right? Because this transformation changes anything, everything. And ah, so it changes the, the complexity of national competition, right? So, you know, even, you know, even if we have the best, uh, weapons, for example, in the United States, look at what Huawei is doing in international telecommunications, right? Uh, if we have the best chips, uh, you know, and the Chinese, uh, are limited to, you know, chips that are, that are exportable or things that they can manufacture themselves, you know, at a much lower grade, like, okay, that's the new terrain of the technological fight that underpins war fighting. And so when things move this fast, like historic advantages like erode really quickly. And so it's important to think broadly about this. And one of the things that, that, uh, you know, that, that you hear almost every conversation, like within the first sentence you'll hear the word drone. And I love drones. I think drones are great. However, look, it's not about drones. It's about a complete technological transformation that underpins military, uh, transformation, uh, social transformation. So we have to think really broadly about this. This is not just a new threat. You know, this new threat now has weapons as good as ours. That's not what this is about. This is about changing the nature of war. This is about the, the role of humans. Uh, you know, one of our, one of our great advantages even in a technological age is the great people, the good people. The lawful people that we have in the US Military and the whole defense establishment. So I, I think, I think you know we're, we're um, you know, we're in a good position still, even though the most of what you hear on the news is negative. But I think we're, we're, but we have to think anew about how we win. Right? And producing things is part of that. But probably much more important than producing things like weapon systems is how we think about our processes, how we think creatively about how we can defeat our new enemies, we in new contexts with new weapons. And so like that sort of imagination for how we win tomorrow is really what the, what the challenge is for us. So I'll leave it, I'll leave it there. But that's a, it's a really important point. This is not just about weapons, right?

Speaker A: Yeah. No. Fantastic. I think you really underpinned the urgency of um, implementing some of these technologies. And you've talked about the fact that you know, the country, the state that has the best weapons doesn't necessarily um, have that guarantee of retaining uh, strategic advantage and decision dominance in the future operating environment. So I guess how do we achieve that transformational change and how do we overcome this crisis of implementation that you've talked about before? Um, because we're in a system that wasn't exactly built for uh, rapid acquisition of these game changing technologies. We're dealing with a bureaucracy that wasn't built for speed. So how do we overcome some of these challeng challenges and really enable progress?

Speaker B: Yeah, exactly. And so you know, if we talk about journals, we talk about weapons, but we really need to talk about culture and we really need to talk about how we achieve our, our goals. Right. And so um, I, I guess like with culture, you know, having spent a couple of years in the Pentagon, um, we have a compliance culture. Right. And our challengers have a performance culture. Right. Look at what the Ukrainians are doing, you know, the technology included in that. But, but more importantly like how do you innovate process? How do you think about like ah, uh, how can I create an advantage now with the technology I have? Or if you get a new piece of technology or if you have a new way of addressing an opponent or an opponent demonstrates a new weakness, like how do we like really aggressively go after those, those weaknesses? And so it's, it has to be a performance culture. And I think unfortunately our bureaucracy, you know, since the 1950s when uh, you know, the Pentagon was built and all these things started to happen you know, we were, we. That was a reflection of an industrial age where capability was represented in material systems, things, right? And so we built things. Today building things is not enough. You have to build a culture. You have to build an imagination for how you can leverage culture, uh, culture or uh, uh, weapons to achieve your objectives on the battlefield or maybe right next to the battlefield or in the capital city by influencing somebody's decision making process. Like okay, so what are the problems? What I call a crisis of implementation really comes from not a, not a lack of innovation but a, ah, failure to execute. Right? And so how we uh, articulate and understand that crisis and how we overcome it in a bureaucracy, uh, um, it's really important that we start thinking about the foundations of our military culture, right? Like we, we remain dominant in industrial age warfare but we often fail to imagine, right, like the cultural and material shifts that have, that really drive us to think differently. Right? And so many, you know, so many people have raged, you uh, know, about the acquisition system almost to the point where it's cliche, right? You know, people say acquisition system and they, you know, they throw their hands up in the air. But, but look, here's the deal. The acquisition folks are following the legacy approaches to winning on the battlefield. That is the approaches that we use to win on the battlefield yesterday or last year or the last decade. Right? Because that's exactly what the services perpetuate in their constructs. Some of the services are doing better than others. And we'll talk about that I think. But, but the, but the services, service constructs are still bound to legacy platforms, right? And legacy platforms are important, don't get me wrong. But they should be silent, they should be invisible, they should be, you know, transparent to radar. I mean like all of these things that now in a, in a uh, in a sensing age and a integration age, where you can quickly move from one capability to another capability through technology and uh, you know, get that, get in speed and intelligence driven by you know, all sensing like all across the ecosystem. Like now you have a whole different way to prosecute an enemy, which means you have to have a whole different way to buy the equipment and develop the concepts for how you're going to do that. And we, we just haven't been able to do that. I mean the, the acquisition outcomes we get are a product of the concepts that we deliver for, you know, for uh, acquisition. And so um, you know, the relationship there has to materially change. How do we go from focusing on the platforms of yesterday to an integrated creative Loop of you know, a series of dilemmas for the enemy that every time they go left they get smacked, every time they go right they get smacked. Every time they stop they get smacked. Every time they go, they get snap, smack like that's that speed and that tempo and that culture of how we think of setting up those ambushes. Um, that's how we need to think about the way we build our weapon systems and our capabilities. It can't be compliance, it has to be performance and it has to be integrative with lots of people at the table that help, that help us imagine what could, what could help us transform the way we think about fighting and then the way we fight as well.

Speaker A: Wow Mike, that's phenomenal. Like moving away from the culture of compliance to uh, performance. I wanted to unpack um, two points that you raised. The first point being um, connecting the sensors and shooters and achieving real integration across the services uh, for multi domain operations. And you also mentioned what we're seeing in Ukraine. It really underpins the importance of that speed and tempo and the ability to adapt quickly, um, to win in future conflict. And I um, mean just last year uh, we saw that the CJC2 reached its minimum viable capability and um, there's other developments, contracts uh, awarded to players like Anduril, um, who are providing some game changing technologies. So I wanted to really ah, unpack. What's the current state of play and in your opinion what really needs to happen to um, enable all domain coordination?

Speaker B: Yeah, so it really is, it's a great question because it's really the most important question like how do we build that culture? And so we really need a system of innovation and ideation that crosses ideological uh, organizational lines. I think one of the challenges we have, I would say the primary challenge we have is tribalism, right? We have tribalism within our units, we have tribalism within our services, we have tribalism among services. We don't share data with people that are not in our tribe. And so like although we have all the technological underpinnings and we have lots of really creative people that are moral and aggressive and focused on winning and uh, uh like we have that in spades but we don't really take advantage of that by, by integrating those things and thinking together and building together. Um, you know one of the things, you know there's a, there's a you know, conversation about you know just dropping um, you know just dropping tech into the force and everything will be fine. You know like, like the, you know the picture is you uh, know, well, we'll just parachute a bunch of tech bros in, right? And here they come and they're just going to land in our, you know, in our foxholes or in our offices or wherever. And uh, they're gonna, they're gonna just code this all up for us. And there's a, there's an element of reality there. But the. Here, here's the thing. It's the integration of the tech bros and war fighters that really make this go, right. It's, it's the war fighters that have, have the operational flow of how combat is executed or how battles are executed or how campaigns are executed. So like, if you don't, if you think that the tech community can from the outside, um, you know, parachute in and say, okay, we'll just code this up for you and everything will be great.

Speaker A: It.

Speaker B: It won't. They can't. Because the expertise in war fighting, whether that's flying a jet, whether that's flying, you know, sailing a ship, whether that's being underwater, maybe that's, you know, digging a foxhole, whatever it is, um, the experts in that flow and that war fighting flow, the people that will feel the effects of tomorrow's battle, they know how they want to project, they know how they want to innovate, they want to know how they can be protected, they want to know how they can, uh, you know, raise help with the enemy. That's that, that culture, that knowledge, that tribal knowledge is so important to this tech integration. And so where we think about, um, tech, uh, innovation, we should not be thinking about products or tools. Products and tools are part of the conversation, to be sure, but it's much more about the creative destruction of the enemy. Like, how do we think cleverly about, uh, our warfighting process? You know, one of my, one of my favorite, uh, uh, ways to think about this is I call it the Jurassic park method of warfighting. Right? Where, um, and that bears some explanation. Um, so in Jurassic park, remember when, uh, you know, the big game hunter was like in the, you know, he was going to hunt down the, the uh, the mother velociraptor, right? And so like he's going through the, you know, through the jungle there and he's got his big weapons and, and then there's a, there's a scene where kind of the, the, the foliage kind of parts and the velociraptor's teeth is like, right. Inches from his head, right? Like, to me, like, wow, okay, great. There's. That, that's a dilemma. That's posed right, like, and so the, you know, the big game hunter turns left, there's a threat on his right, the big game hunter goes forward, there's a front threat to his front. And this is how we have to think about war fighting, right? A series of dilemmas that we create for the enemy by using technology, surveillance, uh, you know, you name it. Every, every, every phenomenology we can get. But to integrate those into a war fighting platform or a war fighting concept context that we can take all of these things and bring them to bear through process. Right? Like we, we have a disciplined way to do this. It's not a tech rodeo where you're just throwing out there. It is all about like how do you build the processes to out cycle your enemy. How do we think differently then about integrating technology? What do we change so that we, we're not a compliance culture, that we're actually a performance culture that is actually geared to win. And that's, that that is missing in the dialogue inside the department. And this is where I think warfighters and technologists too have to kind of, kind of really like assert the integration of tech into these processes that we have today. Because these processes need to change.

Speaker A: Yeah, I love, I love the example with Jurassic Park. And I uh, mean to your point that we can't just drop tech bros and expect that things will miraculously change and everything will be coded and uh, on the next day, uh, we get operational capability that we can roll out. But we are seeing some big commercial moves and uh, attempts to involve uh, disruptors. Um, so recently There was this $200 million OpenAI OTA and so we don't just drop tech bros into the Pentagon. Uh, but how do we approach those partnerships and what role do you see those commercial disruptors playing in the defense ecosystem? So what is the correct approach? Because I'm sure that these technologists and tech bros have a role to play for um, the DOD to stay ahead of the game.

Speaker B: So we really need a system of innovation and uh, ideation that crosses organizational lines. And it's much more than uh, the uh, parachuting tech bros into the Pentagon for example.

Speaker A: Right.

Speaker B: You know, and uh, you know, and we're going to, you know, we're going to let a contract and suddenly all the large language models have an access to the Pentagon that, that's not sufficient. Right. Because what we need is the process for creative destruction of the enemy. Right. And that has to underpin the capabilities that we build. And where is that expertise? That expertise is in War fighters. Right. You know, across the spectrum, you know, from, from, you know, brand new privates who, who have, who, you know, who are tech natives all the way to, you know, old folks that, you know, that, that, that have a real good strategic sense. So like that whole spectrum of users in the department, uh, of defense and our intelligence community and our services, et cetera. Like, it's really important that we understand the relationship between technology and war fighting. Technology is not a replacement for weapon systems. Technology is not a replacement for thinking and doing commanders and warfighters. Um, and, and so, you know, we have to talk about purposeful and sustained interaction with our technology capabilities, which are prolific, and our service cultures and our, our department regulation and cultures as well. Right. Purposeful and sustained interaction. A team. And we don't act like a team today. And there's reasons for that. But a lot of that is, is a, is a, is a legacy of a, um, platform culture. Right. Where the services buy things and then the warfighters have to figure out how to integrate them into a capability. It's, it has to be a much tighter loop now where smart war fighters can articulate a process like here's how I want to get after that problem on the battlefield and the technology folks then kind of help and code that up. Right. So we need an organizational plan, you know, for implementation that has a larger scope. Right. And no ending. Right. It's, it's that focus on war fighting process that has to underpin our new doctrines, our new collaborations and of course our, our new systems, whatever they look like when we're done. I mean we mastered industrial warfare and, and fantastic. We won World War II. Good. It's time for us to move on. Right. Like the, the cultural, the, the cultural bias for platforms, the cultural bias for tribalism. The cultural bias for slow and methodical is to a degree obviated by the tempo and the capability enabled by the technological artifacts that are now available to us.

Speaker A: Right.

Speaker B: We use them every day in our home. We should be using them every day in our weapons development, in our concept development, in our uh, uh, uh, intelligence and surveillance and reconnaissance and fires and maneuver. Like all of those war fighting functions have to be recrafted through the lens of what we can do technologically now to make it faster, more lethal, uh, uh, you know, broader, you know, broadly integrated. And so those things are cultural shifts that um, you don't, you don't hear about when we have, when we, when we basically just, we whine about acquisition.

Speaker A: Uh-huh.

Speaker B: And we don't you know, we don't really think about like, okay, why do we do it this way? And is there something that has changed that would force us to do it a different way? And that's, that's where we're at. And so like this is the conversation. You hear it in different words, of course, but this is the conversation, like do, do we start to move our war fighting capabilities into the digital space so that we can be faster and we can be, you know, better sensors and be better shooters and we get better communicators, like all of those things, uh, will come.

Speaker A: Yeah. And thank you. You've talked a lot about the need for uh, a cultural shift to achieve, um, that transformation. Um, but you've also mentioned um, earlier in the conversation that things aren't actually as bad as it may seem, uh, from just watching the news. And uh, so that brings me to my next question of so what excites you most right now? Uh, whether it's people, programs or any shifts that give you optimism.

Speaker B: Yeah, of course, I mean there's enormous room for optimism. Um, you know, if you, if you walk around in the spaces, you know, at a major command, I mean there's plenty to be frustrated about because you see, you know, war fighters that are not empowered. You see uh, you know, mid grade leaders who are protecting their turf. You ah, see arguments among commands. You know, well, we want the button on the left side of the screen. No, we want the button on the right side of the screen and you know, to you know, colonels are arguing about that. Like, okay, you still see all that kind of stuff. But, but we have to like, we have to disabuse ourselves of this tribalism, right? So I mean in American defense, I mean we, we still have a handful of aces here, right? American technology, American innovation, American will. And the American soldier and sailor and marine and airmen and guardian as well. Um, um, I mean all of those things are huge advantages that we have, right? I would put American war fighters against anybody. But we have to think about like, okay, how do we take care of them and how do we uh, integrate our technology advantages into those human advantages that we have. And so I think probably important thing, um, it's all, it's process and integration focused, right. It requires new methods, right? And so things like, you know, so there are good things like, like diu. It's a great example, Mm m. It's a great example of acquiring technology. But it's not perfect because what, what, you know, okay, now I have a big box of drones. What am I supposed to do with that? Right? You have to have like those kind of capabilities. Not dinging on DIU or drones, because I love them both. But what uh, what I'm saying is like, look, we have to now like, okay, what is the process that we're going to use to use that to actually have effects on the enemy? Right? Like, how are we going to do that? Um, I think things like, I mean the US army is doing all kinds of innovation and experimentation and they're doing it at scale. It's great. Um, but we still carry a lot of our legacy platform oriented things along with us. And so it's important that we start to enable from the top to the bottom and the bottom to the top for like trying to think about what are our new processes for winning on the battlefield, what are our new processes for buying capability. Uh, you know, that's, and that has to be, you know, obviously much faster than it is today, but it readily could be. Um, and then, um, you know, the Navy's doing great things. You know, you go to any, you know, any trade show, you'll see dozens, hundreds of, you know, drones that uh, you know, that sail on that, you know, you know, drones that are almost invisible, you know, that are just sensors floating on the ocean or under the ocean. Um, you see, you know, vehicles that, you know that, that are robotic or have, uh, you know, have a, have a, uh, you know, an operator that's, you know, some distance away. I mean you see like the kernels of technology that we could integrate into real lethal war fighting capabilities if we, if we took the time and we had a sustained focus on that. I think one of the things, you know, that, that I think about a lot. I don't know if you, if you've, you've heard of Andy Marshall and the Office of Net Assessment. I mean this wasn't, this was a Department of Defense thing for decades, right? Andy Marshall was, they called him Yoda and he was the great wise, you know, war fighting thinker about, about you know, technology. But technology driven by war fighting demand signals are opportunities. And so um, that was a really powerful way to think about that. Um, you know, now we have, and this is where things like the third offset or anti access area denial, like good things, you know, but now those were really good ideas but with the technology really wasn't mature enough to support that. Now we have a much better technology environment which actually we can actually start to do some of those strategic concepts, you know, these old strategic concepts that are actually highly relevant to today. If, you know, if we, if we integrate the, the, you know, the technology, uh, uh, opportunities that we have today. We have a real, we have the, we have the makings of just like a, again a world dominating military capability, which is great, right? Like we don't have to use it. I'm just saying we should have that. As, you know, as, as America the nation, this is something that's within our grasp combining thinking, strategic thinking, tactical thinking and, and technology thinking. And that's really, and that's really where we win. Right? We're in a, we're in a period of creative destruction that will lead us to creative construction, right, where we can build, we can build almost anything we want to if we can imagine what we, the effects that we want to have on the enemy. It's, it really is about tempo and scale and it's about recrafting, you know, the American way of war. It's exciting because for all of our complaints about acquisition and whatnot, man, we are sitting on the opportunities to really change, you know, to really propel our capabilities. And if you don't believe it, look at what our enemies are doing, right? And uh, you know, they're doing it at their own scale in their own way. But uh, you know, you can see, you can see our enemies start to move. They are not standing still, still in this environment either. And neither, neither are the, uh, you know, the, the U.S. defense Services. But um, I think it's really important that we, you know, we pay attention to or we start thinking through that lens so that we can make sure that we don't lose any ground against those rapidly advancing threats.

Speaker A: Yeah, it seems like we're in a very unique position on the verge of a revolution. But um, as you mentioned, these changes will require time and it seems like we need to be moving a lot faster. Um, so if you were to implement one change to accelerate defense innovation tomorrow without any constraints, um, what would you do?

Speaker B: Well, you say one thing, so one thing will have lots of parts to it, right? But to describe how to do this, I think we need to move. We have to have a different set of accountabilities, right? And we have to have a different discipline, uh, for integration and we have to have um, a system of, of um, uh, of accountability, right? So, so like this is, this is really important that, like how, how you actually develop a system and you think about like uh, you know, okay, I'm dated. You know, I'm thinking like a SCRUM environment, you know, where, where you're trying to build a piece of software and you're, you know, you're putting post it notes and you're like, okay, you know, we're going to put this process here and then we're going to use this, you know, this machine to do that component and we're going to bring this data in, you know, so, so that sort of like that, that, that, that technological design for how you're building a system to support an outcome, you need to have the same kind of thing in your, in the war fighting space.

Speaker A: Okay?

Speaker B: You know, we have our traditional functions and our dish, you know, our traditional services, like all of those things have, have a use and they have a, you know, they have a background or a legacy. Um, but what we need, but what we need is sort of that sustained innovation environment where you actually, you know, bring young Marines, uh, you know, and technologists together, for example, and let them solve a problem technologically and then, and, and then, and then take credit for that, right? Like, like put a, uh, you know, put a stake in it. Now that's, that's, that's one thing that we know how to accomplish and then take the next step and the next step and the next step. So you have like real war fighters all the way up the chain and down the chain importantly, and you actually start to work through these processes and you should fail often and you should fail early and you should figure out like, yeah, that's not actually going to work because the enemy is probably going to hear this and that's going to, you know, that's going to trigger our ambush or whatever, you know, like so, but you, but you have to build the environment so that people can actually think that way, right? And so when people can actually think that way, then uh, you know, then you have the integration that drives, ah, you know, new innovation. So the integration is really important. The, you know, another really important piece though, besides just integration is um, um, you know, the, the, the banishment of tribalism of course. And uh, I, I would say accountabilities, right? You don't do a scrum forever, right? You do a scrum until you've achieved your software objective and you're done. You have a viable system and you always continue to improve it. But, but you, you, you, you race to that outcome and then you take a pause, right? And then you test and then you, you know, you put it in front of users and you do all these other things. So we have to have that same kind of thing. The accountability never should go away. If we have an accountability for, you know, for winning the sensing environment, uh, you know, on the battlefield tomorrow, undersea, above the sea, in space, on the ground, whatever. If, if that's, if that's our challenge, then let's build that comprehensive systems that actually do that. And you can, you know, components can be, you know, get brought together to do that, but you need to have some accountability for. Yes, we actually have an integrated joint system that, that will process this. And when I say system, I'm not talking about a network. I'm talking about, uh, a network maybe inside, uh, an ecosystem of people, of services, of capability, of mobility, of sensors, you know, like all of that stuff together. We just have to have a lot more monster garages in the Department of Defense. Not just innovation cells where you, you know, you let your hair grow long and you get a T shirt. No, monster garages where you're building things that flow into, um, your, your, your programs of record.

Speaker A: Well, but say these monster garages and, are integrated effectively and the Diu App Works, SpaceWorks, Nautilus, um, those acceleration units are, uh, brought to fruition and they're all working together cohesively, and we have this coherent system and everyone's comfortable with AI technologies because it seems to be the priority, um, integrating and implementing, um, AI. But where does this AI dialogue take us next? So what are we really not talking about now that we should be talking about before it's too late?

Speaker B: Well, I think the conversations across the department are pretty good, but it usually comes down to culture, right? Like the idea of, um, um, crossing service lines or, um, you know, doing something. The ownership, you know, the tribal, inherent tribalism. Right. Of, like how, you know, well, I, this is my command, and so my system is going to work. Act this way. And I don't really care about what you're doing over there, Navy, because you've got your own system and your own command environment. Like, until we actually break those barriers down among tribes. And that's service tribes, of course, but it's, it's much deeper than that, right? It's, it's office politics kind of tribes where, yeah, I'm not really, I don't really want to share that data with you or, um, Yeah, I, I non concur, you know, with your effort. Non concurring is useless. Right? Like, like, I don't, you know, I, I, that's a, that's a, that's a process inside the Pentagon where, you know, people outside or people who have a peripheral interest in a system development or concept development, they'll, they'll they have, they almost all have a veto. Right. Like if they want to bring that to their, you know, to the, if the Navy guy is uh, you know, is uh, unhappy with the way the kylo the dialogue is going, well then the Navy guy would just be, go to the big Navy guys and the Navy will say, yeah, you know what? We're not going to pay for that. We're out. Like, we don't have that, you know, that, that continuity and accountability for integrated development. And so like that, that's so important that we, that we build that. Right. Like we have to have those accountabilities and the process flow. Uh, so that, and with a war fighting focus so that we are sure that we can win in almost any context. Right. And we do that, we do that well in like small units today. I mean you go down, uh, you know, to uh, you know, to uh, uh, you know, any of the major installations that have special operations capabilities. You know, you see that kind of teaming in capability development and operational development and tactic development. That same, that same approach has to replace kind of an acquisition system that is um, uh, you know, focused on platforms.

Speaker A: Right.

Speaker B: And platforms only and platforms to the exclusion of those other, you know, those other integrative concepts. So that's, that, that, that's I think is part, part of how we get past uh, you know, the, you know, the dilemma that we have today.

Speaker A: Yeah, moving away from platforms and more into the digital realm. Um, but as you know, as we are able to achieve that hopefully in the near future, um, what do you expect the next surprise to be? So as we settle into a level of comfort with AI drones, transformation, perhaps even as you said, banning the tribal culture and uh, overcoming some of these challenges that you've outlined. So what is the next surprise and what do you anticipate that the impact of that surprise will be?

Speaker B: Well, I hope it doesn't take uh, an analog of a Pearl harbor moment for us. I mean I, I guess we've seen a lot of maybe, uh, not Pearl harbor, but you know, smaller indications, you know, things like, um, you know, let's look at, you know, a Chinese AI for example. You know, Chinese, I mean they, they graduate more STEM graduates every year than we have graduates of all types every year. Right. So, so there's, there's an enormous juggernaut of, of technical capability, technological capability, uh, you know, in China. And so like I think we should be all over that understanding what, what their, what their compute and technology capabilities are so that we can balance and we can make sure that we understand what our advantages are in this place. Um, you know, I think of it like this, right? Like, like we, we couldn't win World uh, War two without sort of this, this massive, you know, defense, defense industrial juggernaut, uh, that we built. Right? Yeah. And so, but we can't win today. I mean that, that, that platform, lots of steel, uh, you know, uh, that that platform environment is not going to win in this technological environment. Right. In this technological ecosystem now that we're operating in. And so you know, while we couldn't win World War II without that industrial juggernaut, like we can't win today without a juggernaut of tempo, of lethality, of integration, an end of tribalism, integrated capabilities. Um, that, that is so important and that's, that's where um, that's where I think we once again that, that's, that's where we fall short is the culture of success and the culture of winning rather than the culture of uh, uh, complying with rules and uh, the culture of um, break, break. And that's where we see the difference between a culture of uh, rules versus a culture of innovation and getting things accomplished and changing rapidly. And so World War we won World War II because of our industrial uh, our industrial might. We need to win World War 3 or whatever comes in between. Uh, we need to win World War Three with information, uh, information led tempo, information led awareness, information led speed on the battlefield, information led dilemmas that we're posing to the enemy. Like thinking through all of those things is the manual for, you know, it's the manual of dirty tricks, right? How do you win on the battlefield? There's no dirty tricks if they win. Right? So like let's, we got to think about that, you know, through the lens of uh, tempo, lethality and integration.

Speaker A: Right? We're living in the information age and that requires a whole new set of capabilities. And uh. Mike, you've laid out uh, truly what uh, many of us feel intuitively, uh, that it's really not about technology. Defense innovation depends on execution, leadership and cultural transformation. And I think you've beautifully uh, summarized some of the dilemmas and challenges that the defence ecosystem is facing now with how do we move away from the culture of compliance to a culture of performance and really how do we get those um, technologies to the war fighter? So I'm really excited that you'll also be chairing our upcoming CDAO Defense Conference in September in Washington D.C. it's a forum hosted by Kernel Intelligence and we'll be welcoming senior um, decision makers from the DoD, allies and partners, uh, to talk about some of the things we've discussed today. And I'm really excited that you will be moderating the sessions at this conference, and we'll be able to, um, dive even deeper into AI integration, data readiness, innovation, and that cultural transformation that needs to happen. Um, so, John Groen, thank you so much for joining us today, um, for setting the scene for our new podcast and being, um, our guest in the first episode. Um, it's been a really phenomenal conversation. I've learned so much today. Thank you so much for that. And if today's episode sparked something for you, be sure to subscribe and follow our Defense Innovation project. Uh, we've got more episodes, um, coming up with leaders shaping the future of national security. We'll be discussing, uh, topics from autonomy to digital infrastructure and beyond. And thank you so much again, Adrenal Groen, and to our listeners, thank you for tuning in and, uh, we will see you next time. Thank you so much, General Groin, for being with us today.

Speaker B: Hey, thanks, M. Linda. Thank you so much to you and Corinium and, you know, the people that are listening to this podcast. I mean, you have a lot of choices right there. There is a lot of good thinking out there. There are a lot of ways to think about the future of warfare, the future of technology and how we react to that. So I appreciate those, you know, those of you who are now who are participating in this podcast, look, keep thinking about this, right? This is a cultural shift that will come from, from below. It will come from above, and it'll come from outside. Uh, and it'll be driven by the capabilities that we see our enemies building every day. So it is a critical conversation. We think deeply about, um, about. About building the culture that wins inside the department. And so, uh, uh, Linda and Corinium and everybody else, look, thanks for, you know, thanks for caring about this dialogue. Thanks for continuing to be curious about how we make things better. And then thanks for acting. Right. Let's work together to actually get to the place where, where, uh, you know, we're the same powerhouse that we were in the industrial age. That, that, uh, you know, that doesn't have. That doesn't happen from, you, uh, know, from inside the Pentagon. That comes from war fighters from top to bottom. It comes from defense interested people. It comes from companies that feed the defense enterprise. Like all of you have such an important part of building this culture and making, you know, changing our ability to win tomorrow on an information battlefield. Um, uh, it's. It's, uh. It's really exciting, and I, uh, wish you all the best. Thank you very much, Linda.

Speaker A: Thank you so much for these kind words, Mike. It's all about collaboration and bringing the, um, the great minds together to achieve transformational change. So thank you again.

Speaker B: Awesome. Thank you.

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